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ABSTRACT
Fault Detection and Isolation of Wind Turbines using Immune System
Inspired Algorithms
Esmaeil AliZadeh
Recently, the research focus on renewable sources of energy has been growing
intensively. This is mainly due to potential depletion of fossil fuels and its associated
environmental concerns, such as pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Wind energy
is one of the fastest growing sources of renewable energy, and policy makers in both
developing and developed countries have built their vision on future energy supply based
on and by emphasizing the wind power. The increase in the number of wind turbines,
as well as their size, have led to undeniable care and attention to health and condition
monitoring as well as fault diagnosis of wind turbine systems and their components.
In this thesis, two main immune inspired algorithms are used to perform Fault
Detection and Isolation (FDI) of a Wind Turbine (WT), namely the Negative Selection
Algorithm (NSA) as well as the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA).
First, an NSA-based fault diagnosis methodology is proposed in which a hierarchi-
cal bank of NSAs is used to detect and isolate both individual as well as simultaneously
occurring faults common to the wind turbines. A smoothing moving window filter is then
utilized to further improve the reliability and performance of the proposed FDI scheme.
Moreover, the performance of the proposed scheme is compared with the state-of-the-art
iii
data-driven technique, namely Support Vector Machine (SVM) to demonstrate and illus-
trate the superiority and advantages of the proposed NSA-based FDI scheme. Finally,
a nonparametric statistical comparison test is implemented to evaluate the proposed
methodology with that of the SVM under various fault severities.
In the second part, another immune inspired methodology, namely the Dendritic
Cell Algorithm (DCA) is used to perform online sensor fault FDI. A noise filter is
also designed to attenuate the measurement noise, resulting in better FDI results. The
proposed DCA-based FDI scheme is then compared with the previously developed NSA-
based FDI scheme, and a nonparametric statistical comparison test is also performed.
Both of the proposed immune inspired frameworks are applied to a well-known
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The need for renewable energy sources has been growing significantly, especially due to
the energy crisis and its associated environmental concerns. Wind energy is one of the
fastest growing source of renewable energy for power generation in past years. Conse-
quently, the Wind Turbine (WT) industry is getting bigger as more large-scale WTs are
being used. On the other hand, high operational and maintenance costs are the major
economic constraints in the WT industry. These concerns have made the investigation
into fault diagnosis of WT systems an imperative and active area of research. Therefore,
this thesis explores the Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) of various fault scenarios in
WT systems.
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To address the task of FDI, Computational Intelligence (CI) methods are consid-
ered. The use of CI to address complex real-world problems has been increasing mainly
due to the limited use of model-based methods, particularly when a process is too com-
plicated for mathematical reasoning, or the process has a stochastic nature. Among
various CI techniques, Artificial Immune System (AIS) is rapidly emerging in many
fields such as classification, pattern recognition, computer security problems, anomaly
detection, and etc. The main reason for the growing research interest in AIS is due to
its significant information processing capabilities such as classification, pattern recogni-
tion, optimization, learning, memory, and distributed parallel processing. In this thesis,
two AIS algorithms, namely the Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) and Dendritic Cell
Algorithm (DCA)) are employed to perform the FDI task within the WT system.
1.2 Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI)
Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) problem has been the subject of many research
activities due to its importance in industry. According to Isermann [1], a fault is defined
as follows:
“A fault is an unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristics property (feature) of
the system from the acceptable, usual, standard condition.”
It should be noted that there is a difference between a fault and a failure. Unlike a fault
that causes a deviation in a system characteristic from its nominal situation, a failure is
2
“a permanent interruptions of a system’s ability to perform a required function under
specified operating condition [2].”
In general, three fault types can occur in a plant (shown in Figure 1.1) as follows [3]:
1. Sensor faults,
2. Actuator faults,







Sensor faultSystem faultActuator fault
Figure 1.1: Different types of fault.
The task of fault detection as well as fault isolation can be defined as below:
 Fault detection: indicates if there is a fault in the actuator, sensor, or component.
 Fault isolation: determines which actuator, sensor, or component is faulty.
In other words, fault detection basically determines when a fault occurs (the time of




Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) approaches can be divided into two categories:

















Figure 1.2: Physical redundancy versus analytical redundancy (adapted from [4]).
1.3.1 Hardware/Physical Redundancy
Physical redundancy is a popular option for applications that require high reliability and
safety such as in large-scale WTs, flight-critical systems, and nuclear plants. In physical
redundancy approaches, multiple sensors, actuators, or components are exploited at
critical locations. In terms of sensor redundancy, multiple sensors measuring the same
quantity are available, and any discrepancies between sensor measurements may indicate
a fault within the monitored system.
4
A conventional fault diagnosis technique that is broadly used in industry is N -
Modular Redundancy (NMR) approaches, where N is the number of modules available
to perform a similar task. Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR) uses an extra set of
equivalent modules, and in case of any discrepancy between the two outputs, it would
be difficult to tell which one is faulty. When a DMR is available, a common FDI
approach is first to detect the fault (or failure) by a direct comparison of the dual
sensors, and then to perform isolation or identification tasks using one of analytical
redundancy approaches (explained in Section 1.3.2) [5]. However, the proposed FDI
scheme in Chapter 5 performs both fault detection as well as fault isolation tasks.
The most common form of NMR is the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
(N D 3) that is usually integrated with a majority voting mechanism [6]. In case
of hardware redundancy, a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is usually con-
ducted to verify any defective element. However, the literature based on FDI from
control system perspective do not usually include methodologies based on FMEA [7].
1.3.2 Analytical Redundancy
The analytical redundancy FDI methodologies can generally be categorized as follows
[8–10]:
1. Knowledge-Based Approaches: These methods usually require an advance
knowledge of the observed system such as training and learning data. Initially,
5
these methods employ a large amount of historic data to extract the underlying
knowledge of the system variables. From this perspective, knowledge-based fault
diagnosis is also known as data-driven fault diagnosis. Based on the extraction
process, the knowledge-based approaches can be divided into the following cate-
gories [10]:
a. Qualitative Knowledge-Based Methods: Expert reasoning such as IF-
THEN logic, or in general, rule-based fault diagnosis methods are among the
most popular techniques in this category.
b. Quantitative Knowledge-Based Methods: These methods can be di-
vided into the statistical-analysis based methods such as Principal Component
Analysis (PCA), Support Vector Machine (SVM), or non-statistical-analysis
based methods in which Neural Networks (NNs) have been the most known
approach. In addition to the statistic and non-statistic fault diagnosis, a joint
data-driven approach can also be used.
Moreover, most Artificial Immune System (AIS) algorithms (including the
ones used in this thesis) are considered to be in this category. It should
be mentioned that the proposed FDI scheme in Chapter 4 is a quantitative
knowledge-based approach.
2. Signal-Based Approaches: These methods are based on the measured signals
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and symptom (pattern) analysis rather than the explicit input-output models.
Signal-based approaches can be divided into three categories as follows: a) Time–
Domain Methods, b) Frequency-Domain Methods, and c) Time-Frequency Meth-
ods [9].
3. Model-Based Approaches: These methods are usually divided into three cate-
gories as follows:
a. Observer-Based Approach: This approach is the most common model-
based FDI method. In observer-based FDI approach, system outputs are
estimated from the measurements (or a subset of measurements) using either
Luenberger observer in deterministic settings or Kalman filter in stochastic
setting, and output estimation errors are then taken as residuals [11].
b. Parameter-Estimation (System Identification) Approach: In this me-
thod, physical parameters of the system (such as mass, viscosity, or resistance)
are estimated and then compared with the actual value of the parameter in
faultless condition. Consequently, a fault can be detected if there is any
discrepancy between the estimated and actual values.
c. Parity Relation Approach: In this approach, a consistency check based
on parity relations using inputs and output measurements are made. Con-
sequently, faults can be detected if there is any inconsistency in the parity
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relations.
4. Hybrid Approaches: These methods fuse different approaches mentioned above
to improve the FDI performance.
1.4 Literature Review
1.4.1 Literature Review on Fault Diagnosis of Wind Turbines
Recent years have witnessed immense interest on fault diagnosis of WT systems. Odgaard
et al. [12, 13] introduced a benchmark model of a WT at the system level for FDI and
Fault Tolerant Control (FTC) applications, subject to sensor, actuator, and system
faults. A review of the works that use mostly this benchmark model is provided next.
In [14], a model-based fault diagnosis approach is proposed by using interval-based
Analytical Redundancy Relations (ARRs) and interval observers. An FDI and FTC
approach based on Set-Valued Observers (SVOs) theory is developed in [15]. Chen et
al. [16] have proposed a combined observer and Kalman filter approach in which the
generalized likelihood ratio test and the cumulative variance index are used for residual
evaluation. A diagnostic approach is proposed in [17] that uses a secondary H1 filtering
scheme for FDI of a horizontal axis WT.
The work [18] addressed both the FDI as well as the FTC problem of the WT
benchmark model through designing virtual actuators/sensors by using an input-output
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model. In [18], the problem of the FDI was addressed in which interval observers are
employed for fault detection and a row-reasoning technique is employed for the fault
isolation stage. Moreover, a batch least square approach was used for fault estimation
purposes.
The paper [19] proposed an estimation-based approach to perform the FDI of the
WT benchmark model. In [19], fault detection task is achieved by a fault detection esti-
mator, and a bank of fault isolation estimators are utilized to perform the isolation task.
The work [20, 21] employed a set-membership FDI mechanism for the WT benchmark
model.
In [22], a robust data-driven fault detection strategy that uses parity-space method
is introduced, in which robust residual generators are constructed directly from the pro-
cess measurements. The work [23] proposed a novel data-driven FDI scheme for a WT
benchmark based on time-series and data analysis. In [23], the fault detection task
is achieved by using the Gibbs Sampling algorithm, and the fault isolation task was
performed by a Fuzzy/Bayesian network. The paper [24] utilized a mixed Bayesian/Set-
membership approach for the fault detection and isolation of the WT. In [24], the fault
detection task is formulated using the set-membership context; however, the fault iso-
lation task is achieved based on the theoretical fault signature matrix, in which a novel
Bayesian fault isolation methodology is proposed.
An FDI scheme based on the Takagi-Sugeno fuzzy models that are identified from
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input-output measurements is proposed in [25–27]. Another data-driven approach that
is successfully applied to FDI of WTs is the SVM in [28–30]. In [29], while most faults
were detected and isolated through SVM, however, Kalman-like observers were designed
to detect and isolate faults in the pitch actuator system. The work [30] also used a hybrid
method for the FDI of WTs. Besides the SVM, a residual-based technique is used for
the FDI of certain faults. More precisely, a three-layer Artificial Neural Network (ANN)
was used to estimate the pitch angle for residual generation purposes.
A frequency-based fault detection technique is suggested in [31] for detecting
changes in WT gearbox resonance frequencies. In [32], a fault diagnosis and FTC scheme
is developed for the Individual Pitch Control (IPC) of WTs. The developed methodol-
ogy in [32], activates and deactivates the IPC component of the WT blades based on
the fault detection results.
Several FDI schemes applied to the wind turbine benchmark model are evaluated
and compared in [13,33,34].
1.4.2 Literature Review on FDI using AIS Methodologies
The vertebrate Immune System (IS) (such as human IS) is an effective defensive mech-
anism that protects the body against any foreign invader. AISs model the natural IS
by replicating and developing interesting paradigms that can be used in real-world ap-
plications. AIS is a sub-field of bio-inspired computing technologies that belongs to the
10


























Figure 1.3: Branches of computational intelligence (CI).
1.4.2.1 Literature Review on Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA)
Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) is used in various applications like: change de-
tection, fault detection, pattern recognition, and particularly in computer security and
network intrusion detection. Few works that utilized the NSA are mentioned below.
The Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) was first introduced in 1994 by Forrest et
al., [35], as a change detection method in the field of computer security problem. In [35],
the computer security problem was transformed to the problem of distinguishing self
from non-self.
After the original work [35], there have been numerous attempts to utilize the
NSA for computer security problems. In [36], both real-valued negative selection with
fixed-sized detectors (RNSA) and variable-sized detectors (V-detector) are compared
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with SVM and K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), in which V-detector showed superior per-
formances compared to the other ones. In [37], an intrusion detection mechanism is
introduced based on the real-valued dual Negative Selection (NS), in which each newly
generated detector has to go through three steps that are: 1) the detector should not
be detected by the existing ones, 2) the detector should be discarded if it detects the
self space, and 3) the distribution of detectors should be optimized with the goal of the
detection efficiency. It should be noted that the first two steps of detector generation
is similar to the original NSA. The papers [38, 39] also employed the NSA for network
intrusion detection systems (IDS).
The work [40] integrated a hardware implementation of NSA with an embedded
system for malware detection tasks. An adaptive NSA, in which the detector set is
updated regularly, was proposed in [41] with the task of detecting any DoS (Denial of
Service) attack, that is very important in cloud environments. The work [42] applied an
improved version of the NSA to Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in order to detect
any anomaly. In [43], the NSA is utilized along with the artificial bee colony algorithm
for intrusion detection in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs).
The paper [44] worked on developing an intrusion detection model based on the NS
mechanism. In [44], the problem of “black hole” in the original NSA was investigated.
Consequently, the Minkowski distance is utilized as the matching rule in order to enhance
the performance of the NSA by reducing the number of black holes resulting in a better
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detection rate.
In [45,46], a motor bearing fault detection and diagnosis based on NSA is proposed.
The work [47] investigated the use of real-valued NSA for aircraft fault detection, in
which datasets from the NASA Ames man-in-the-loop high-fidelity C-17 flight simulator
were employed in order to diagnose the behavior pattern of the aircraft flight. In [48], a
bank of NSAs was developed to detect and isolate faults in a wind turbine system.
There were also few attempts to use NSA in function optimization problems. For
instance, the paper [49] proposed a parallel implementation of the NSA to handle con-
straints in genetic algorithms. There have also been many attempts to address drawbacks
of the original NSA as well as to improve the performance of the NSA. Consequently,
various NSA versions have been developed, some of which are mentioned below:
A Distribution Estimation based NSA (DENSA) is proposed in [50] in which a
Gaussian Mixture model is employed to fit the normal space (or self-space). The paper
[51] proposed an Immune Optimization based Real-valued NSA (IO-RNSA) that has
better time efficiency as well as less number of generated detector compared to traditional
real-valued NSA. A boundary-aware NSA is developed in [52], in which the proposed
algorithm interprets the training data as a group, unlike the original NSA that is an
instance-based algorithm.
In [53] and [54], two novel NSAs with constant detectors were proposed to perform
anomaly detection tasks. These novel versions of NSA are as follows: a Boundary-Fixed
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NSA (FB-NSA) and a Fine Boundary-Fixed NSA (FFB-NSA). In both FB-NSA and
FFB-NSA, a layer of detectors is generated to enclose the self-space.
The work [55, 56] applied the NSA along with the particle swarm optimization
(PSO), called NSA-PSO, to an email detection system, in order to distinguish spam
emails from non-spam ones. In [57], a modified NSA was developed by integrating a
local selection differential evolution (DE) (hence, referred to as NSA-DE ) for detector
generation.
In [58], an intelligent fault diagnosis based on NSA was developed and successfully
applied to fault diagnosis of large machine units in petrochemical industries. The paper
[59] investigated the application of NSA in detecting faults in refrigeration systems.
In [59], a differential encoding mechanism is utilized to reduce the size of the shape
space. In addition, two matching rules, namely r-contiguous bits as well as Euclidean
distance, are compared.
Tao et al. [60] proposed a Novel NSA (NNSA) in which a co-stimulation signal
is required to start the detectors. NNSA utilizes the entropy information to estimate
the detector coverage by evaluating the density of detectors. The paper [61] proposed
a Modified NSA (MNSA) for diagnosis of voltage disturbances in distribution electrical
systems. In [61], the affinity of the detector candidates are evaluated by calculating
the value of population combination (VPC), which is used as a metric to eliminate the
unnecessary detectors in the censoring phase. The work [62] used a popular version
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of the NSA named V-detector for medical diagnosis purposes such as BUPSA Liver
Disorder, Biomedical, and Breast Canver Wisconsin experimental results.
The paper [63] proposed a Bidirectional Inhibition Optimization R-variable NSA
(referred to as BIORV-NSA or BIOR-NSA) to overcome one of the biggest problem
of the original real-valued NSA that is the “black holes” issue, resulting in excessive,
unnecessary detector generation to cover a small portion of the self-space.
A brief description of various NSA versions is available in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: A summary of various NSA versions
Algorithm name Purpose of Development Experimental Setup
NSA-PSO [55,56]
(PSO: Particle Swarm Optimization)
 Improving the random detector generation using PSO
 Use of the Local Outlier Factor (LOF) as a fitness function Email spam detection system
DENSA [50]
D istribution Estimation based NSA
Efficient detector generation & more flexible boundary
for self-space by using a Gaussian mixture model
Tested on NSL-KDD dataset
IO-RNSA [51]
Immune-Optimization Real-valued NSA
 Addressing the high time-complexity & redundant detector
coverage by introducing an immune optimization mechanism
Tested on Breast Cancer Wisconsin,
Iris, and Abalone UCI datasets
ENSA [64]
Extension NSA
 Efficient detector generation & better detector coverage
 Improving the algorithm robustness Tested on Iris dataset
FB-NSA & FFB-NSA [53,54]
(Boundary-F ixed NSA) (F ine Boundary-F ixed NSA)
 Non-random detector generation to reduce the training time
 Generating a layer of detectors around the self-space
 Tested on the Fisher’s Iris Data
 Tested on ball bearing fault data
NSA-DE [57]
(DE: D ifferential Evolution)
 Use of DE for the detector generation phase
 Overcoming the problem of overlapping detectors Email spam detection system
NNSA (Novel NSA) [60]
 Use of co-stimulation signal for activating the detector
 Use of information entropy for a better detector coverage
 New matching rule function for antigen recognition
 Used for recognition problems
 Tested on Breast Cancer, Iris,
and KDD CUP 99 UCI datasets
MNSA (Modified NSA) [61]
Changes in the censoring/learning process by using the
Value of Population Combination (VPC) to evaluate the
similarity of detector candidates
Diagnosis of voltage disturbances &
high-impedance faults in distribution
electrical systems
BIORV-NSA / BIOR-NSA [63]
(B idirectional Inhibition Optimization
R-V ariable NSA)
 Overcoming the “black hole” issue
 Removing unnecessary detectors Tested on UCI datasets
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1.4.2.2 Literature Review on Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)
The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) was first proposed by Greensmith [65] as a part
of the Danger project [66] with the task of applying a paradigm of state-of-the-art
immunology to the computer network intrusion detection problems. The proposed DCA
in [65] (referred to as the standard/classical/original version of DCA) includes many
stochastic elements and has over ten parameters . Consequently, a deterministic version
of the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (referred to as deterministic DCA (dDCA)) was proposed
in [67] with fewer parameters, making it easier to analyze as well as apply.
Although the DCA has been mostly applied to computer security and intrusion
detection problems, however, DCA has been successfully applied to other fields such as
anomaly detection, fault detection, classification problems, pattern recognition, and etc.
Next, few applications of DCA in different fields are provided.
The paper [68] proposed an effective spam filtering model in which the decisions
of Na¨ıve Bayes (NB) and SVM were fused and integrated with the DCA. Then, the
proposed model was tested on two SMS spam datasets and showed promising results.
In [69], the DCA was utilized for malware detection in Android smartphones.
The paper [70] proposed a rotating machinery fault diagnosis scheme based on the
DCA, and also applied the developed methodology experimentally on a “Multi-Fault
diagnosis rotating machinery test bed” showing its effectiveness.
In [71], a novel Fuzzy deterministic DCA (FdDCA) is proposed by combining
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dDCA, K-means clustering, and fuzzy sets; and experimental results based on real-
world datasets showed its applicability. In [72], a fault detection system was proposed
to detect parametric faults in analog circuits using a fuzzy DCA.
The DCA has been also utilized in pattern recognition problems. For instance, the
work [73] developed a plant classification method based on recognition of leaves. In [73],
a wavelet transform was used to generate the texture features (features space) required
by the classifier, in this case the DCA.
A modified DCA (mDCA) was introduced in [74] with the aim of an online error
detection in robotic systems. The proposed mDCA was implemented successfully in
both simulated robotic units as well as on a resource constrained micro-controller. The
paper [75] presented the Diagnostic DCA (D-DCA) to perform online fault diagnosis in
a robotic system, in case of stuck-at-faults conditions. In [76], dDCA was utilized for
multi-path detection in a GPS time-series. The work [76] was implemented successfully
on a static antenna, showing its capability to be used in more complicated GPS mul-
tipath detection problems. The paper [77] employed the DCA as a robot classifier and
successfully implemented the DCA on a real robot.
Due to importance of data preprocessing phase in the DCA, many works were
conducted to investigate the DCA data preprocessing phase that includes feature ex-
traction as well as signal categorization steps. In [78], a statistical method, namely
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principal component analysis (PCA), was utilized to automatically generate new fea-
tures (by performing data dimension reduction) and then feeding them to the DCA.
Chelly and Elouedi [79] have investigated the use of Rough Set Theory (RST) and
fuzzy rough set as a preprocessing step in the DCA, resulting in many versions of the
DCA as follows:
 RST-DCA [80] that is based on the RST,
 RC-DCA [81] that is based on two main concepts of the RST, namely the REDUCT
and the CORE.
 QR-DCA [82] that is based on a framework of the RST, namely the QuickReduct
algorithm.
 FBR-DCA [83] that is based on the fuzzy RST and utilizes the Fuzzy Boundary
Region (FBR) to ensure a better data preprocessing phase.
 FRST-DCA [84] that is also based on the Fuzzy RST.
 RST-MFDCM [85] that is based on a two-level hybrid model, in which the RST
was utilized to perform the data pre-processing, and a Modified Fuzzy Dendritic
Cell Method (MFDCM) (proposed in an earlier work [86]) was utilized to smooth
the crisp separation among the DCs’ context.
 FLA-DCA [87] that is an improved version of the FRST-DCA. Unlike FRST-DCA
that uses fuzzy sets and membership functions, FLA-DCA uses a fuzzy lower
approximation and similarity relations resulting in less calculations compared to
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FRST-DCA.
Recently, researchers are working on FDI of aircraft by using an information
processing algorithm that mimics the way dendritic cells operate in the IS. In their
work [88,89], no DCA-based algorithm (or any of its variants) is utilized. Instead, their
work is based on generation of a self/non-self space (or equivalently, generation of non-self
detectors) that requires a training phase. Therefore, the inputs to their FDI framework
are sets of non-self detectors that are generated through NS mechanism. Their pro-
posed framework would also not benefit from the main aspect of the DCA, that is the
unsupervised learning perspective as well as the need for a training phase.
Table 1.2 lists few other popular variants of the DCA that had been successfully
applied in real-world applications.
Table 1.2: Survey of various DCA versions
Algorithm name Purpose of Development Experimental Setup
dDCA [67]
(deterministic DCA
 Deterministic version of the original DCA
 Fewer algorithm parameters
 Simpler algorithm analysis
Tested on an Intrusion Detection System
dataset, namely the ping scan data
mDCA [74]
(modified DCA)
Online implementation on a resource-constraint
microcontroller




Online fault (stuck-at-fault condition)
diagnosis in a robot
FdDCA [71]
(Fuzzy deterministic DCA)
Smoothen the sharp boundaries between signals
by using fuzzy sets and K-means clustering
Tested on several UCI datasets like
Wisconsin Breast Cancer
Integrating SVM & NB with DCA [90]
(SVM: Support Vector Machine)
(NB: Na¨ıve Bayes)
 Generating input signals for the DCA by using
the SVM and the NB
 Improving the classification performance
Mobile SMS spam datasets
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1.5 Thesis Contributions
 In Chapter 4, multiple NSAs are employed to detect and isolate faults in the
WT system. For the detection task, an NSA that is trained under normal or
healthy operation of the WT is used to detect any abnormality in the system.
For the isolation task, several NSAs are trained within a hierarchical architecture
to isolate various faulty scenarios, including presence of simultaneous faults. A
moving window filter is also utilized to improve the overall performance of the
NSAs and to remove the outliers for enhancing the reliability of the proposed
NSA-based FDI scheme. Moreover, the proposed scheme is compared with another
data-driven methodology, namely the Support Vector Machine (SVM) method
to demonstrate the advantages and capabilities of the proposed NSA approach.
Finally, a nonparametric statistical comparison test is conducted to compare the
proposed NSA scheme with the SVM.
 In Chapter 5, a framework based on the DCA is proposed to detect and isolate
sensor faults in a system. In order to perform the goal of FDI for complex systems,
a bank of DCA filters is applied in a distributed manner. The proposed DCA-
based FDI methodology is then compared with the proposed NSA-based scheme
developed in Chapter 4 in order to demonstrate its effectiveness and advantages.
Like in Chapter 4, a nonparametric statistical comparison test is conducted to
compare both the DCA-based as well as NSA-based FDI schemes.
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1.6 Thesis Layout
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
 Chapter 1 includes the literature review on two main topics. First, recent works
on the fault diagnosis of the wind turbines are introduced in Section 1.4.1. Then,
a literature review on fault diagnosis using Artificial Immune System (AIS) with
the focus on Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) (Section 1.4.2.1) and Dendritic
Cell Algorithm (DCA) (Section 1.4.2.2) are presented.
 Chapter 2 provides the background information and the detailed model of the
wind turbine that is used in this thesis. The description as well as the model of
common fault scenarios in the WT system are also presented.
 Chapter 3 provides the necessary information about the nature of the AIS and
biological paradigms that can be concluded from vertebrate immune systems. The
main focus would be on background information of the two AIS algorithms con-
sidered in this thesis that are NSA (Section 3.1) and DCA (Section 3.2).
 Chapter 4 introduces the proposed Fault Detection and Isolation methodology by
using the Negative Selection Algorithm. The simulation results of implementing
the proposed FDI methodology on the WT is also presented and compared with
another data-driven technique, namely Support Vector Machine (SVM).
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 Chapter 5 presents the proposed Fault Detection and Isolation methodology by
using the Dendritic Cell Algorithm. The simulation results of implementing the
proposed FDI methodology on the WT is also presented and compared with the
NSA-based methodology proposed in Chapter 4.




Overview of Wind Turbine System
In this chapter, a wind model as well as the Wind Turbine (WT) component models,
including mathematical formulation of the WT subsystems, and the complete nonlinear
state-space representation of the WT are presented. The operational regions of the WT
and the corresponding control system strategies are also provided. Finally, a number of
most commonly occurring fault scenarios in the WT system are introduced, and details
corresponding to the considered faults and their models are presented.
2.1 Wind Model
In this section, a wind model including all its components that affect the wind speed is
presented. The wind model is composed of four main parts, namely [13]:
a) the mean wind speed vm.t/,
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b) a stochastic behavior of the wind vs.t/,
c) the wind shear (difference in wind speed by height) effect vws.t/,
d) the tower shadow effect vts.t/.
vw.t/ D vm.t/C vs.t/C vws.t/C vts.t/; (2.1)
where vw.t/ denotes the overall wind speed. The mean wind speed captures the slow
variations of the wind and is obtained by low pass filtering the wind data measurements.
The fast wind speed variations, also known as wind turbulence, determine the stochastic
behavior of the wind. Modeling the dynamical properties of the turbulence can be
obtained based on two types of spectra, namely: von Karman and Kaimal, although
Kaimal’s spectrum has been shown to be a better fit to experimental data [91]. More
detail on the Kaimal model as well as other models describing the stochastic behavior
of the wind is available in [91]. Both wind shear and the tower shadow effects (namely,
vws.t/ and vts.t/, respectively) depend on the angular position of each rotor blade, and
correspondingly, they are different from one blade to another. The equation describing






























where R denotes the radius of the rotor, H denotes the tower height, ˛ denotes the
empirical wind shear component, and b.t/, b D 1; 2; 3 denotes the angular position of
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each blade (also known as the azimuthal angle) with respect to an arbitrary position,
r.t/. Correspondingly, one has 1.t/ D r.t/, 2.t/ D r.t/ C .2=3/ , and 3.t/ D
r.t/C .4=3/ .





Nb.t/ . .t/C .t// ; (2.3)
where
 .t/ D a2 R
2   r20
.R2 C r20 / sin. Nb.t//2 C k2/
;
.t/ D a2k2 .r
2
0  R2/.r20 sin. Nb.t//2 C k2/
R2sin. Nb.t//2 C k2
;













a denotes the radius of the tower, r0 denotes the radius of the blade hub, and k denotes
the distance between the tower midline and the blade. Figure 2.1 illustrates the wind
model parameters used in equation (2.3). The floor function, floor.x/ D bxc, yields the
largest integer less than or equal to x.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the wind speed sequence that is collected from actual mea-
sured wind data. This predefined wind speed sequence is used in the WT benchmark
model [13].
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the wind turbine subsystems (adapted from [93]).
2.2 Wind Turbine Model
In the WT model selected, the turbine has a given power capacity that is equipped with
three-bladed horizontal axis turbine, a full converter coupling and a generator that is
both variable speed and pitch-controlled. An insight to a typical modern high-power
WT showing its main components is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
The WT model consists of three main subsystems, namely: blade and pitch subsys-
tem (combining the aerodynamic and the pitch actuator model), drive-train subsystem,
and the generator and converter subsystem. The interconnections among the wind tur-
bine components and modules are depicted in Figure 2.4. The rotor and generator
variables are designated by the subscripts r and g, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of the wind speed, vw.t/, used in the WT benchmark model.
2.2.1 Aerodynamics Model
In this section, the basic mechanism of WT and how the wind energy is converted to
the rotational motion of the WT rotor blades are provided. A significant parameter in
the aerodynamics performance of the WT is the power coefficient, Cp, which is defined
as the ratio between the captured power by the rotor Pr.t/ and the total wind power
Pwind.t/ D 12Av3w.t/, where  denotes the air density and A denotes the rotor swept
area. Therefore, the power delivered to the rotor is given by
Pr.t/ D Pwind.t/Cp..t/; ˇ.t//: (2.4)
As noted in equation (2.4), Cp is a function of the pitch angle ˇ.t/ and the tip-speed
ratio .t/. The tip-speed ratio is the ratio between the tip speed of the blade (vtip.t/)
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Figure 2.3: Main Components of a typical modern high-power WT (reprinted from [94]).
and the wind velocity (vw.t/), that is .t/ D vtip.t/vw.t/ D !r .t/Rvw.t/ , where !r.t/ denotes the
rotor rotational speed and R denotes the rotor radius (length of one blade). Typical
variations of the power coefficient, Cp-coefficient, which is plotted based on the look-up
table available in the WT benchmark model, is illustrated in Figure 2.5. Cp;max denotes
the maximum power coefficient at point .o; ˇo/. The angle ˇo is usually very small
(ˇ  0) meaning that the maximum power capture occurs at ˇ D 0. On the other


















Figure 2.4: Overview of the wind turbine subsystems.
WTs (ˇ D 0) operate with maximum efficiency only at a unique vw [95].
The aerodynamics of the WT is expressed as the torque acting on the rotor blades.







2.2.2 Pitch Actuator System
The WT hydraulic pitch system consists of actuators that adjust the pitch angle, ˇ.t/,





























Figure 2.5: Typical variations of the power coefficient, Cp, for a variable-pitch WT. Note that
negative values are set to zero.



















where i D 1; 2; 3 corresponds to the i -th blade,  and !n denote the damping ratio and
the natural frequency of the pitch actuator model, and ˇi; ref.t/ denotes the reference
pitch angle that is provided by the WT controller based on the operational region of
the turbine. Figure 2.6 illustrates the pitch actuator model. As can be seen in Figure
2.6, there are constraints on both the pitch slew rate as well as the pitch angle that are
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embedded within the WT benchmark model. However, according to [95], a typical range










Figure 2.6: A schematic of the pitch actuator system for the i -th blade.
The pitch actuator system together with the aerodynamic model make up the
Blade and Pitch System (BPS). Table 2.1 lists the parameters of the pitch actuator
system and the aerodynamic model.
Table 2.1: Parameters of the pitch actuator and aerodynamic model (BPS).







The Drive-Train (DT) is a mechanical linkage connecting the low-speed shaft (rotor) to
the high-speed shaft (generator). The DT includes a gearbox that transfers the rotor
torque to the generator, and results in an increase of the rotor rotational speed to a
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Figure 2.7: A schematic of the WT drive-train.
Applying the Newton’s second law for rotation for both rotor as well as generator
results in the following equations, namely
Jr Rr.t/ D r.t/   LSS.t/   Br!r.t/; (2.7)
Jg Rg.t/ D HSS.t/   g.t/   Bg!g.t/; (2.8)
where r.t/ and g.t/ denote the rotational angles of the low-speed shaft (LSS) and
high-speed shaft (HSS) respectively, !r.t/ denotes the LSS (rotor) speed (!r.t/ D Pr.t/),
!g.t/ denotes the HSS (generator) speed (!g.t/ D Pg.t/), Jr and Jg denote the moments
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of inertia of the low-speed and high-speed shafts, respectively, Br and Bg denote the
viscous frictions of the low-speed and high-speed shafts, respectively, and g.t/ denotes
the generator torque (explained in Section 2.2.4). LSS.t/ and HSS.t/ denote the torques
acting on the LSS and HSS, which can be obtained as follows
LSS.t/ D KDT.t/C BDT P.t/; (2.9)
HSS.t/ D DT LSS.t/
Ng
; (2.10)
where KDT and BDT denote the torsional stiffness and the torsional damping coefficient
of the drive-train, respectively, DT denotes the efficiency of the drive-train, and .t/
denotes the torsional angle of the drive-train (describing the twist of the flexible shaft)









Note that the shaft angles r.t/ and g.t/ (except for .t/) are not of interest in
modeling of the DT dynamics [93].
The differential equations describing the complete dynamics of the drive-train
model can be obtained by differentiating equation (2.11) and also by combining equa-
tions (2.9) and (2.10) into equations (2.7) and (2.8) as follows














!g.t/   g.t/; (2.13)
P.t/ D !r.t/   1
Ng
!g.t/: (2.14)
The parameters of the DT model is available in Table 2.2. The differential equations


















































Table 2.2: Drive-train parameters.
KDT Jr Jg Ng
2:7  109 Nm
rad
55  106 kg m2 390 kg m2 95









2.2.4 Generator and Converter Model
The most common generator that is used in the variable-speed WT is the doubly-fed
induction generator [96]. Since the generator torque, g cannot be changed instanta-
neously, the WT generator and converter dynamics at the system level, can be approx-




Tgc s C 1; (2.16)
where Tgc denotes the time constant of the first order system, and g; ref denotes the
generator reference torque that is provided by the wind turbine controller according
to the operational region of the WT as described subsequently in Section 2.3. The
time-domain version of equation (2.16) is given as follows:





Figure 2.8 shows the converter dynamics. Similar to the pitch system, there are
bounds on both the slew rate, Pg , as well as the generator torque, g that are embedded









Figure 2.8: A schematic of the converter.
35
The power that is produced by the generator, Pg , is given by
Pg.t/ D g !g.t/ g.t/; (2.18)
where g denotes the generator efficiency. The parameters of generator and converter
subsystem used in this benchmark model is available in Table 2.3. More details on the
generator and the converter model are available in [97].
Table 2.3: Parameters of the generator and converter subsystem.
Power Capacity g Tgc
4:8MW 0:98 0:02 s
2.2.5 Combined Model
The complete model of the wind turbine can be obtained by combining the models
developed in Sections 2.2.1 – 2.2.4. Figure 2.9 illustrates the interactions among all WT
subsystems and provides the available sensor measurements in the benchmark model. A
snapshot of the WT Simulink model (see Figure B.1) is included in Appendix B.
The following nonlinear state-space representation of the wind turbine system,














































































































































































Blade & Pitch System (BPS)
Figure 2.9: Schematic of WT subsystems.
(2.6), (2.15), and (2.17) as follows:




























!g.t/C DTKDTJgNg .t/   1Jg g.t/
























where the wind speed, vw.t/, represents the exogenous input, the state vector x.t/ 2 IR10
and the controlled input u.t/ 2 IR4 are given by
x.t/ D Œ!r.t/ !g.t/ .t/ g.t/ ˇ1.t/ Pˇ1.t/ ˇ2.t/ Pˇ2.t/ ˇ3.t/ Pˇ3.t/T;
u.t/ D Œg; ref.t/ ˇ1; ref.t/ ˇ2; ref.t/ ˇ3; ref.t/T:
It should be noted that all three pitch actuators receive the same pitch reference angles in
this benchmark model. The output equation based on the available sensor measurements
(refer to Figure 2.9) is expressed as follows:
ym.t/ D Œ!r;mj .t/ !g;mj .t/ g;m.t/ Pg;m.t/ ˇi;mj .t/ vw;m.t/T C .t/;
where i 2 f1; 2; 3g refers to the i -th blade, and j 2 f1; 2g corresponds to the redundant
sensor measurements available for the particular WT parameter. In the WT benchmark
model [13], it is assumed that redundant sensors cannot be faulty simultaneously, al-
lowing the control system to reconfigure itself in case of occurrence of a sensor fault.
The WT sensor measurements are perturbed with an additive noise, .t/, to repre-
sent and capture the non-ideality of the sensor readings. The added noise signals are
modeled as Gaussian random processes with means and variances (based on practical
experiences [13]) as presented in Table 2.4. It should be noted that the sampling period
selected for discretizing the continuous-time model (2.19) is set to 0.1 seconds.
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Table 2.4: Measurement noise parameters.
ˇi !r !g Pg g vw
Mean 0 0 0 0 0 1:5 m
s




1  103 W 90Nm 0:5 m
s
2.3 Operational Regions of the Wind Turbine
Variable-speed wind turbines have four main operational zones depending on the mean
wind speed. These control zones are depicted in Figure 2.10 and are defined as follows:
 Zone 1: In zone 1, the WT is not operational and is waiting for higher wind
speeds (0   3m/s). The WT enters zone 2 when wind speed reaches the cut-in
speed (the minimum speed at which the WT delivers useful power).
 Zone 2: This zone starts once the mean wind speed reaches the cut-in speed.
Zone 2 is referred to as the partial-load region (or the power optimization region).
The wind turbine is operating in zone 2 (3  12:5m/s) with the goal of optimizing
the generated power by maximizing the wind energy capture. This task can be
achieved at the maximum power coefficient point Cp;max at which ˇ D 0ı (see
Figure 2.5). Consequently, the controller sets ˇi; ref D 0 for an optimal power
capture.
 Zone 3: In zone 3 (12:5   25m/s), the WT is operating at its rated speed (the
speed at which the rated power of the WT is produced), and the controller should
maintain the power reference Pref by limiting the captured wind energy so that
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the mechanical load is not exceeded. Pref can be obtained by maintaining the g;ref
in equation (2.18), so that g; ref D Prefg!g . Commonly, a Proportional-Integral (PI)
controller is used to maintain !g.t/ at its nominal value by controlling ˇi; ref. This
zone is referred to as the full-load region.
 Zone 4: In zone 4, the wind turbine is shut down at cut-out speed (the maximum
speed at which the WT is allowed to operate) due to high wind speeds (> 25m/s)
to avoid any damage to the turbine [13].
Zones 1 and 4 are not considered in the benchmark model since the focus is on
WT faults under normal operations, and consequently, only the control modes of zones
2 and 3 are taken into account in this work. The controller outputs under both modes
are the reference pitch angle ˇi; ref and the generator reference torque g; ref. In the power
optimization region (zone 2), the pitch reference is set to zero for optimal power capture
from the wind. However, in the constant power generation region (zone 3), the controller
outputs are produced in such a manner to maintain the nominal generator speed [13,98].
2.4 Common Faults in the Wind Turbine Systems
In this section, the commonly occurring faults on the WT components and their effects

























Figure 2.10: Reference power curve of the WT based on the wind speed.
in this thesis are also provided below.
Table 2.5 provides a list of the most significant faults in the WT (at the system
level), including faults that are considered in the benchmark models [12,13,99].
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Table 2.5: Critical faults that are considered in the WT benchmark model [13,99].







Rotor speed measurement Fixed value /
ScalingGenerator speed measurement
Generated electrical power Scaling
Tower top accelerometer Offset
Blade root bending moment sensor Scaling























2.4.1 Selected Fault Scenarios
The details corresponding to the considered faults in this work are also provided below.
First, three specific and commonly occurring faults that are affecting the WT measured
variables are considered as described below.
1. Fault 1 (System Fault): This fault occurs due to accumulation of debris on
the blade (such as dirt, etc.) and results in a change in the aerodynamics of the
WT. Its occurrence directly affects the generated electrical power Pg (by usually
lowering the obtained power). The corresponding fault model is given by
QPg;m.t/ D QPg.t/CfPg.t/C Pg.t/; (2.20)
where fPg.t/ D .ıfPg   1/ QPg.t/ represents the fault term with its loss of effec-
tiveness represented by ıfPg , where 0 < ıfPg  1, and Pg denotes the external
measurement noise. QPg.t/ represents the added effects of DT oscillations to equa-
tion (2.18) as follows:
QPg.t/ D Pg.t/C P sin.2P t /;
where P and P denote the amplitude and the frequency of the oscillation, re-
spectively.
2. Fault 2 (Sensor Fault): Pitch misalignment may occur due to a faulty sensor
that would appear as an incipient fault or due to an incorrect assembly of blades
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during installation of the WT, in which this issue would be existed from the be-
ginning of the WT operation. Here, the former scenario (pitch misalignment due
to a faulty sensor) is considered. This fault may cause extra fatigue loading on
the tower and the blades, resulting in a lower machine life-time [99], [100]. This
additive fault is modeled as
ˇm.t/ D ˇ.t/Cfˇ C ˇ .t/; (2.21)
where fˇ represents the fault bias term (fˇ D 0 in case of no fault), and ˇ
denotes the external measurement noise.
3. Fault 3 (System Fault): This fault occurs when there is a variation in the
drive-train damping (equation (2.22)). The drive-train oscillations could be due to
wear and tear and give rise to additional fatigue loading on the DT components,
particularly at high wind speeds. This fault model is given by
Q!g;m.t/ D !g.t/






where ! D .ıf!g   1/! represents the fault term (ıf!g D 1 in case of no
fault), !g denotes the external measurement noise, !g;max denotes the maximal
generator speed, and ! denotes the oscillation amplitude coefficient.
Chapter 4 studies the detection and isolation of the above faults, in which an
NSA-based FDI scheme is developed for this purpose.
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2.4.1.1 Sensor Measurement Faults
The two main types of sensor faults considered are either a fixed value or a gain factor
on the measurements and can be due electrical or mechanical faults in the sensors. The
FDI of faults in the pitch angle measurements, ˇi;m , is very important due to their
use in the internal controller of the pitch system [13].
Rotor and generator speeds are measured using encoders, which can also become
faulty. The encoder may be stuck at a certain value (fixed value fault), and hence will
not be updated. In case of a gain factor fault, the encoder counts more marks on the
rotating part than the actual value [13]. Faulty rotor and generator speed measurements
are denoted by !r;m and !g;m , respectively.
The two sensor fault types are modeled as follows:
a. Fixed value fault: Equations (2.23) and (2.24) model the fixed value fault in
both pitch angle as well as in rotational speed sensor measurements, respectively,
ˇi;mj .t/ D ˇi.t/Cˇi;mj C ˇ .t/; (2.23)
where ˇi.t/ is given by equation (2.6), and ˇi;mj represents the fault fixed value
term (ˇi;mj D 0 in case of no fault), and
!p;mj .t/ D !p.t/C!p;mj C !p.t/; (2.24)
where !p.t/ (p D g; r in case of generator and rotor, respectively) is given by
equation (2.15), and !p;mj represents the fault fixed value term (!p;mj D 0 in
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case of no fault).
b. Gain factor fault: Equations (2.25) and (2.26) model the gain factor fault in
both pitch angle as well as in rotational speed sensor measurements, respectively,
ˇi;mj .t/ D ˇi.t/Cfˇi;mj .t/C ˇ .t/; (2.25)
where fˇi;mj .t/ D .ˇi;mj   1/ ˇi.t/ represents the fault term, and ˇi;mj
denotes the gain factor (ˇi;mj D 1 in case of no fault), and
!p;mj .t/ D !p.t/Cf!p;mj .t/C !p.t/; (2.26)
where f!p;mj .t/ D .!p;mj   1/ !p.t/ represents the fault term, and !p;mj
denotes the gain factor (!p;mj D 1 in case of no fault).
Chapter 5 studies the detection and isolation of the sensor measurement faults
mentioned above, in which a DCA-based FDI methodology is proposed to perform FDI
of the sensor faults that are included in the WT benchmark model [13].
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, the detailed model of the WT subsystems as well as the wind model are
presented. Moreover, the main operational regions of the variable-speed WTs and the
corresponding control strategies are explained. Finally, the commonly occurring faults
in WTs are presented and the considered faults in this work are modeled.
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Chapter 3
Overview of Artificial Immune
System
Inspired by the vertebrate Immune System (IS), the field of Artificial Immune System
(AIS) has emerged as a promising biologically inspired Computational Intelligence (CI)
technique. Important immunological mechanisms that are currently used in the AIS
are immune networks, clonal selection theory, Negative Selection (NS) process, and
the DAnger Theory (DAT) models, particularly the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA).
Immune networks theory is commonly applied in learning and memory, as in the work
of [101]. Clonal selection principle has many applications in search and optimization
problems [102], as well as in other engineering applications like in [103], and the Negative
Selection Algorithm (NSA) as well as the DAT model have gained immense interest
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amongst researchers in anomaly and change detection topics [35].
Both the NSA and DCA were developed based on different complex defense mech-
anisms of the IS in protecting body against any infection. Based on the functionality and
type of defense, the IS can be divided into two types that are: innate immune system
and adaptive immune system. Both innate and adaptive immunity work together to get
rid of the disease-causing agents, known as pathogens, like parasites, viruses, bacteria,
and etc [104].
1) Innate immune system (nonspecific immunity): The innate IS is the first
line of defense against diseases and consists of important immune cells such as DCs,
macrophages, and natural killer cells. The innate IS cells respond to pathogens
in a generic (non-specific) way by performing an inflammatory response once a
Pathogen-Associated Molecular Pattern (PAMP) is recognized. The DCA was
developed based on the way DCs operate in the innate IS.
2) Adaptive immune system (specific immunity): Adaptive IS consists of lym-
phocytes (a type of white blood cell), particularly T-lymphocytes (T-cells) and
B-lymphocytes (B-cells). These cells of the adaptive IS can distinguish different
types of pathogen, and consequently trigger different immune responses against a
specific type of pathogen (and hence, the name specific immunity). An important
attribute of the adaptive immunity is the self/nonself recognition property that
allows the IS to distinguish the self (body’s own cells) from the nonself (foreign
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invaders). Unlike the innate IS’s rapid response (usually in hours), the adaptive IS
has a slower immune response (typically in days), particularly in the first encounter
of a pathogen. However, the adaptive IS also possess immunologic memory, mean-
ing that in case of the second encounter with the same disease-causing agent, a
faster and more effective immune response (referred to as the secondary response)
will be induced [105]. The NSA was developed based on the maturation of T-cells
in the adaptive IS.
3.1 Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA)
The Artificial Immune System (AIS) is an abstract of the complex vertebrate Immune
System (IS), which borrows important mechanisms in the natural IS to computational
systems with the main goal of problem solving. An important element of the IS is the
T-cells (or T-lymphocytes) that play a key role in the IS.
T-cell is a type of white blood cells that performs important immune functions,
such as circulating throughout the body looking for abnormalities. A unique feature
of T-cells is their ability to differentiate between normal and abnormal (infected or
cancerous) cells in the body.
The surface of T-cells is covered by a number of receptors (detector) known as the
T-cell Receptor (TCR) that are generated through a pseudo-random genetic rearrange-
ment process [106]. They have the capability of detecting antigens (foreign proteins).
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Any protein that can be matched with these TCRs is considered as a malicious object.
The T-cells that bind to self-molecules are destroyed, while the ones that do not bind are
permitted to leave the thymus [106]. This censoring process of the T-cells in the thymus
is known as negative selection. This complex mechanism by which the IS differentiates
the body’s own cells (self) from the foreign cells such as viruses and bacteria (non-self)
is known as the Self-Non-Self (SNS) discrimination mechanism.
NSA is inspired by SNS discrimination theory and was first introduced in [35].
The body’s own molecules are considered to be normal or healthy data (self), while
any pathogens such as viruses, fungi, or bacteria are regarded as the faulty data. The
main engineering consideration in the NSAs is to cover as much as the non-self region as
possible with a minimum number of detectors [107]. The basic mechanism of the NSA
can be described as follows [106]:
1. Define the Self set (S) that describes the normal behavior of a system that needs
to be monitored.
2. Generate a set of detectors (denoted by D), each of which fails to match any
element in S .
3. Monitor new observations for any change by matching the detectors in D against
the new observations.
The negative selection algorithm involves two stages that are shown in Figure 3.1.
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Add to Detector set (D)
Enough
Coverage/Detector?
End of detector generation

















Figure 3.1: The basic NSA methodology and its phases.
First, in the training stage (the first two enumerations), a set of detectors D is
generated in which the candidate detectors are trained to be tolerant to the healthy
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data samples S (Figure 3.1(a)). In most negative selection algorithms, the candidate
detectors are generated randomly and are checked with all the system healthy data in
a point-wise manner so that not to match any normal data at the training phase. In
the detection (monitoring) phase (Figure 3.1(b)), the new data will be checked with the
matured detectors in set D so that any anomaly can be detected [107].
Some of the most important characteristics of NSAs deal with representation
schemes, matching rules, and detector generation/censoring processes. Data could be
binary (or string), real-valued or hybrid representation of both binary and real-valued.
Detectors can be represented by various shapes such as hyper-rectangles [108], hyper-
spheres [107], and hyper-ellipsoid [109], and the most common detector representation
is the hyper-spheres. One reason for the popularity of hyper-spheres is due to their
easier implementation, since they can be represented by a center (a multi-dimensional
point) and a radius. Whereas a hyper-rectangular detector is represented by two multi-
dimensional data points specifying the lower and upper corners of the hyper-rectangle.
It is also difficult to work with hyper-ellipsoidal detectors due to the way they are gen-
erally represented, which is based on the orientation of their semi-axes. Moreover, in
many engineering applications, data samples (self-set) are represented as hyper-spheres,
hence the use of hyper-sphere representation for detectors would be more convenient.
In [110], a framework for generating detectors is presented.
The matching rule defines the affinity measure (distance) on the shape space.
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Various matching rules have been defined according to the data type. Hamming distance
[111], r-contiguous bits [35], and r-chunk matching [112] represent as some of the binary
matching rules that are used with binary data [113]. The most commonly used matching
rule associated with the binary data is the r-contiguous matching [63].
In case of real-valued data, Manhattan distance, infinity norm distance, and most
commonly the Euclidean metric are utilized to represent the data and detectors [107].
The detector generation/elimination procedure represents as another important charac-
teristic of the NSA and can be implemented by using one of the following approaches
[113]:
 Random generation of candidate detectors followed by the censoring mechanism,
 Genetic algorithm,
 Greedy algorithm or other deterministic algorithms.
In this work, due to the real-valued nature of data samples that are collected from
the WT measured variables, and the associated real shape-space, a real-valued NSA is
employed. Data points are represented as hyper-spheres with fixed self-radius (Rself)
that determine their thresholds. However, there is no universal mean to decide on the
particular value of the self-radius, and this is commonly determined empirically [114].
The main objective of the NSAs is to cover the entire non-self region with detectors
that are represented as spheres with either fixed-radius or variable-radius. As an illustra-
tion, and without loss of generality, a 2-dimensional representation of shape space with
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constant-sized (fixed-radius) and variable-sized (variable-radius) detectors are shown in
Figures 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), respectively. It follows readily that variable-sized detectors
have better performance in covering the non-self region, particularly on the boundary
between the self and the non-self regions. By utilizing variable-radius detectors, fewer
detectors are needed to cover the non-self region, in comparison with the fixed-radius
detectors.
(a) Constant-sized detectors. (b) Variable-sized detectors.
Figure 3.2: The main NSA concept having different detector radii (motivated from [107]).
In this thesis, a real-valued NSA known as the V-detector [107, 115] (originally
developed in [116]) is selected and implemented. In this algorithm, the size of the
detectors covering the non-self region is variable (and hence the label variable-detector
or V-detector). The distance measure used is the Euclidean distance and data samples
are considered to be spheres. The objective, as stated above, is to cover as much of
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the non-self region as possible. The flowchart describing the details on the V-detector
algorithm is depicted in Figure 3.3.
In the V-detector algorithm, first a candidate detector x (represented by the pair
.dc; Rd /) centered at point dc with a radius Rd is randomly generated. Then, the
Euclidean distance, d , between x and every detector .dj ; Rj / in the detector set D is
calculated. If x is detected by another detector in D (d < Rd ), then the detector x is
eliminated. If not, the Euclidean distance, s , between x and every sample si in the
self set S is evaluated. It should be noted that all samples have a fix self-radius denoted
by Rself . If s > Rd C Rself , meaning that there is no interference between the sample
si and the candidate detector x, then x is added to the detector set D. However, if
s < Rd CRself , meaning that the sample is interfered with x, then the detector radius
Rd is shortened to Rd D s   Rself . If the shortened detector radius is negative, the
candidate detector x is eliminated and the whole process starts all over again. If not,
the candidate detector x with the shortened radius is added to set D. Next step is to
check whether the number of detectors in D is greater than preset maximum number
of detectors Tmax . If so, the detector set D is finalized. However, if the number of
detectors in D is less than Tmax, then another criteria is checked and that is whether
the minimum coverage is achieved or not. If the minimum coverage of the non-self space
is achieved, then the detector set D is finalized and will be ready for the monitoring
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Figure 3.3: The flowchart of V-detector generation algorithm (the candidate detector x (dc ; Rc)
is centered at dc with the radius Rd ).
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3.2 Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)
For decades, immunologist thought that the IS differentiates between self molecules and
non-self molecules coming from outside of the body. This was based on the idea of SNS
discrimination theory stating that the vertebrate IS has the capability of distinguishing
the body’s own cell (self) from any foreign cells (non-self). Therefore, based on the
SNS models, foreignness of a particular cell is the reason that leads to stimulating the
immune response. However, IS as described by SNS theory offers no explanation for
the phenomena such as transplantation and autoimmunity (immune system response
against its own body cells) [117].
An immunologist Polly Matzinger proposed DAT [117] and offered an alternative
explanation for how immune systems work. Based on the DAT, any damage to the body
triggers the IS by sending danger signals, and in the case of absence of a danger in a
tissue, the innate IS can suppress the immune response [65].
3.2.1 Overview on Dendritic Cell Biology
Dendritic Cells (DCs) are considered as professional phagocytes that play an important
role in the IS. Phagocytes are white blood cells that protect the body by engulfing foreign
particles such as bacteria, dirt, etc, and then digesting them as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
In DAT, the task of DCs is to collect, process, as well as present the antigen
to the T-cells. Figure 3.4 shows the overall process of the maturation of a DC and
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how a pathogen triggers the innate IS. Under healthy conditions, if body cells are no
longer needed, they may commit suicide during a controlled process called apoptosis
or programmed cell death to regulate the growth and development of the cells. Due
to apoptosis, immuno-suppressive molecules (referred to as Safe Signals) are released
indicating that all is normal in the tissue, and consequently promoting immune tolerance
[118]. The phenomenon of apoptosis is shown in the top part of Figure 3.4. In contrast,
when cells are under stress due to an injury or a damage in the tissue, they die during
a process called necrosis, which is usually caused by external factors such as trauma,
infection, etc. If a cell undergoes through necrosis, it will burst and release Danger
Signals [118]. This phenomenon is shown in the bottom part of Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Apoptosis and necrosis and DCs (reprinted from [118]).
Moreover, DCs have the capability to sense the danger signals (released as a result
of necrosis), safe signals (released as a result of apoptosis), and PAMPs are molecules
associated with pathogens such as virus, fungi, bacteria, etc). DCs are also sensitive
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to inflammatory signals originating from the tissues in case of inflammation due to an
infection or tissue injury. However, inflammatory signals only amplify the effects of other
three signals and will not have an effect on DCs behavior if they are used alone. The
four main immunological signals are briefly summarized below [79]:
 PAMP Signal (PS): Released in case of presence of any pathogen (such as
bacteria).
 Danger Signal (DS): Released in case of an unplanned cell death (necrosis).
 Safe Signal (SS): Released in case of a planned cell death (apoptosis).
 Inflammatory Cytokine (Inflammatory Signal)s (ICs): ICs (also called in-
flammatory signals) are released when there is an inflammation in a tissue.
The behavior of DCs and their maturation level depends on the concentration
of the immunological signals mentioned above. DCs always exist in one of the three
maturation states at any given time [104]:
 Immature DC (iDC): iDCs are the initial maturation state of DCs, in which they
collect the transmitted immunological signals, and based on their concentration,
iDCs change their maturation level to either a partially maturated state (and hence
called semi-mature DC) or to a fully maturated state (and hence called mature
DC).
 Semi-mature DC (smDC): iDCs become partially mature (or semi-mature) if
they are exposed to higher amount of SSs than PSs and DSs.
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 Mature DC (mDC): iDCs become mature DCs (mDCs) if they are exposed to
a higher amount of PSs and DSs compared to SSs.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the DC’s mechanism in the IS. The sampled input signal
and antigen are fed into the selected iDC from the DC pool. Interleukin-10 (IL-10) and
interleukin-12 (IL-12) are also referred to as the semi-mature and the mature output
signals, respectively. Upon exposure to high concentrations of the IL-10 and IL-12 , an
iDC matures into the smDC and the mDC, respectively. The other DC output is the
Co-Stimulatory Molecule (CSM), which is responsible for the DC migration when the
DC reaches its migration threshold M. A graphical illustration of the signal processing
within a DC is shown in Figure 3.6, in which the DC outputs are updated based on the
concentration of the input signals. It should be noted that each DC in the DC pool has
an assigned lifespan L, such that when the L D 0, the DC will be reset and joins the DC
pool. If the amount of the IL-12 (the mature output signal) is greater than the amount
that IL-10 is produced (so that IL-12  IL-10), then the migrated DC (referred to as
the stimulatory DC) provides the reactive Cytokines by stimulating the killer T-cells
(Cytotoxic T-cells) in the adaptive IS. Otherwise, the migrated DC will regulate the
T-cells (referred to as the suppressor/regulatory T-cells) in adaptive IS by suppressing
the T-killer cell. If at the end, there are killer T-cells, an immune response would be

































Figure 3.5: Flowchart of how a DC works in the immune system.
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Figure 3.6: The signal processing of a DC model (adapted from [65]). The IC signal is not
shown in the model.
3.2.2 The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)
The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) is developed based on an abstract model of the DC
biology (explained in Section 3.2.1). The DCA is first introduced by Greensmith [65] as
part of the Danger Project [66] with the goal of applying a paradigm of state-of-the-art
immunology to the problem of the computer network Intrusion Detection System (IDS).
The DCA is based on a pool of DCs, making it a population-based algorithm with
each artificial cell acting as an agent within the system (unlike most negative selection-
based algorithms that are instance-based). In [119], a frequency analysis of a single DC
was performed in order to analyze the flow of information through the DCA. According
to [119], a single DC can be modeled as a low-pass filter.
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The most important step of any DCA version is the choice of the input signals to
the algorithm. The DCA usually does not require any training phase. Hence, if expert
knowledge is not available or the selection of input signals for the DCA is not trivial,
feature extraction or statistical inference methodologies can be utilized to obtain the
most suitable features for DCA input signals.
There are two types of DCA input data: signals and antigens. Signals (explained
in Section 3.2.1) are vectors of real-valued numbers indicating the status of the observed
system. There are three time-varying signals, namely PS, DS, and SS, in addition to
the IC signal. The semantic of these biologically inspired signals is as follows:
 PAMP Signal (PS): A signal that indicates the occurrence of an abnormal
behavior. An increase in PS is linked to a high confidence of abnormality.
 Danger Signal (DS): A signal that increases in case of an anomalous situation
with a less confidence level of abnormality as compared to the PS.
 Safe Signal (SS): A signal that indicates a normal behavior, and its value in-
creases in conjunction with the predictable normal behavior of the system.
 Inflammatory Signal (IC): A signal that amplifies the effects of other immuno-
logical signals and has no effect if it is used in isolation.
More details on the background of different signals are explained in Section 3.2.1.
Another type of input data is antigen without which the DCA will not be able
to function. Antigens are categorical values corresponding to entities of a monitored
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system that need to be classified [120].
Each DC within the DC pool has a limited lifespan (related to CSM value) upon
its creation. Following that, the DC migrates to a processing center known as the lymph
node, where the DC presents the antigens coupled with the output signals that has
already been collected during its lifespan [65]. Based on the context of the signals, the
DC differentiates into either: smDC which suppresses the immune response, or mDC
that stimulates the immune response.







.WijSi/; j D 0; 1; 2 (3.1)
where
 Wij denotes the signal weights connecting the i th input to the j th output,
 i is the input signal category (PS when i D 0, DS when i D 1, and SS when i D 2)
 j is the output signal value where
– j D 0 is a Co-Stimulatory Molecule (CSM),
– j D 1 is a smDC output signal,
– j D 2 is a mDC output signal.
In most DCA versions, the effects of the IC signal are ignored (i.e., IC D 1).
The overall procedure of the DCA is given in the Pseudocode 1. First, a signal
database is created through fusing the input signals with antigens, and this task is
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achieved through the functions get antigen(), store antigen(), and get signal(). Then,
the function calculate output signals() evaluates the output signals for each DC using the
input signals (PS, DS, and SS) and a set of pre-defined weights based on equation (3.1).
The objective is to classify the antigens based on output of a population of DCs. As a
given DC receives more input signals, its level of co-stimulatory signal (known as Co-
Stimulatory Molecule (CSM) that is related to the DC’s lifespan) is increased. Once the
CSM reaches the Migration Threshold, the DC stops collecting (sampling) input signals
as well as antigens, and migrates to the lymph nodes where the collected antigens are
presented. Based on the antigens presentations, each DC forms a cell context that is later
used to calculate the anomaly metric for each antigen type (or equivalently, to classify
the antigens). After presenting the antigen, the DC is removed from the population and
is replaced by a new cell. More detail on the mechanism of the DCA is available in [79].
The original DCA that was introduced in [65] has many parameters and stochastic
elements that made it difficult to be implemented. The same authors proposed a deter-
ministic version of the DCA known as deterministic DCA (dDCA) in [67] and tested the
algorithm to validate its performance. In [74], a modified DCA (mDCA) was introduced
with the aim of an online error detection in robotic systems. The proposed DCA-based
framework is based on modifications of and extensions to the mDCA.
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Pseudocode 1: DCA algorithm [121].
Input: Antigen and Signals
Output: Anomaly Metric
Initialization







if smDC > mDC then
cell context = 0 ;
else
cell context = 1 ;
end
kill the cell;
replace the cell in the population;
for each Antigen type do




In this chapter, an overview on the way human Immune System (IS) operates and its dif-
ferent defense techniques are provided. In addition, two important mechanisms inspired
from the Artificial Immune System (AIS), namely the Negative Selection Algorithm
(NSA) and Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) are presented, and the background as well




In this chapter, an FDI methodology based on the Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA)
is proposed. The proposed methodology is then applied to the wind turbine benchmark
model in order to illustrate the capabilities of the proposed scheme. A comparison
between the NSA-based FDI scheme and a well-known data-driven technique, namely
the Support Vector Machine (SVM) is made. Moreover, a non-parametric statistical
comparison test is conducted to compare the performance of the developed NSA-based
FDI methodology with the SVM.
4.1 Proposed NSA-based FDI Scheme
The block diagram depicting the main steps of the proposed NSA-based FDI scheme is
shown in Figure 4.1. The aim of the Preprocessing Data block is to process the input
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data through feature selection, sampling, and normalization to be used for the NSAs.
Important features of the system should be carefully chosen to ensure crucial system
characteristics are observed, so that when a fault occurs in the system, the selected
features do capture the system abnormal behavior from which the FDI task can be
accomplished. All the candidate detectors (that are spheres in this chapter) should be
checked with every data sample in the self set S to ensure that the candidate detector
does not cover any data sample. Therefore, data sampling is implemented to obtain
a subset of the original data for reducing the runtime complexity of the NSA training
stage. Data normalization is a crucial step in data preprocessing for implementation of
real-valued NSAs. The data is generally normalized within the range of Œ0; 1 or Œ 1; 1.
In this work, the WT measurement outputs are normalized within the range of Œ 1; 1









WT outputs Fault #
Figure 4.1: The main steps for implementation of the proposed NSA-based FDI scheme.
A summary of the most commonly developed fault diagnosis techniques in the
literature versus the proposed NSA-based FDI scheme is given in Table 4.1.
69
Table 4.1: A comparison of the proposed NSA-based FDI methodology against other FDI










Isolation of system faults
(due to drive-train vibrations)
Estimation-based approach ([16,19,34]) X Linear   (except [34])
Set-Membership method ([20,21]) X Nonlinear X  (except [20])
Robust FDI filter [122] X Linear  
Support Vector Machine ([28,30]) X Nonlinear  
Fuzzy method ([25,27]) X Nonlinear  X
Proposed NSA-based FDI method X Nonlinear X X
In the proposed FDI scheme, a number of NSAs are configured in multiple layers








(Fault Isolation 2 & 3)
NSA1,2
(Fault Isolation 1 & 2)
NSA1,3
















Figure 4.2: The bank of NSAs for the proposed NSA-based FDI scheme.
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Each NSA consists of center and radius of the spheres (detectors) that cover the
non-self region of the shape space. For example, NSA0 contains details on all detectors
(the radius and center of all the spheres) covering the shape space of the non-self region
associated with the healthy condition. Each NSA is generated and trained based on the
flowchart that is shown in Figure 3.3. For each data sample s.t/, the residual signal r.t/
that is generated by an NSA is given by
j .t/ D
s.t/   dj ; (4.1a)
r.t/ D f .s.t// D
†
1 9 dj 2 D s.t. j .t/  Rj < Rself ;
0 otherwise,
(4.1b)
where dj denotes the j -th detector in the detector set D, Rj denotes the radius of the
j -th detector, and j .t/ denotes the Euclidean distance between the j -th detector and
the data sample s.t/. Figure 4.3 depicts the Euclidean distance between the detector and
the sample under both healthy as well as faulty scenarios. For simplicity, and without
loss of generality, the Euclidean norm is illustrated in the two-dimensional space.
For performing the fault detection task, the first NSA, namely the NSA0 is trained
to detect any abnormality in the WT system and to remain insensitive to only normal
and healthy samples that are generated by the WT model. However, given that the
other goal is to isolate a fault, therefore for performing this task a parallel bank of











(b) Faulty condition (r.t/ D 1).
Figure 4.3: The sample-detector distance (monitoring phase).
particular fault only. The first layer in the bank of NSAs (namely, NSA1, NSA2, and
NSA3) isolates the faults that do not occur simultaneously. This layer is activated only
when a given fault is detected by NSA0. Given this scenario, the fault residual in this
case is denoted by r0.t/ D 1. The second layer of NSAs (namely, NSA1;2, NSA2;3, and
NSA1;3) is responsible for isolating concurrent faults, and is trained to be insensitive to
multiple faults. For example, NSA1;2 is trained to isolate the simultaneous occurrence
of Faults 1 and 2. It should be noted that for training the bank of NSAs, various fault
severities are considered in generating the detector set for each NSA.
For eliminating outliers as well as for improving the performance of the binary
residuals that are generated by the NSAs, a moving window filter is applied to the fault
residual signals. This filter will move and slide (with a particular given window size)
over the fault residuals that are generated by the NSAs. Depending on the number of
faulty samples within each window, a decision is rendered to as if all samples in the
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window should be categorized as faulty or not. Depending on the type of fault, different
window filter parameters will be utilized. For the Faults 1 and 2, a moving window with
a length of 0.2 seconds is used, and if more than 75% of samples in the window are at
the high state (that is, when r1.t/ D 1 or r2.t/ D 1), the entire window will be set to 1.
However, for the Fault 3, the same window length is chosen but with a lower threshold.
If at least 50% of the residuals in the window is faulty, the entire window will be set
to 1. The reason for this change has to do with the nature of the fault type, which is
shown as a change in the amplitude oscillation of !g . The parameters of the window
filter (namely, the window length and the threshold) are tuned empirically according to
the fault detection and false alarms performance results.
Depending on the characteristics of the residuals generated by NSAs, a decision is
made as to whether a fault has occurred or not; and in case of a fault declaration, its
type is also determined. The fault detection and isolation logic can therefore be stated
as follows.
Fault Detection and Isolation Logic
Assuming that a fault is detected by NSA0 (that is, r0.t/ D 1), the decision for isolating
the faults based on the first layer of NSAs is made as follows: If the i -th residual signal
is zero, i.e., ri.t/ D 0, while the other residuals are active, that is rj .t/ D 1, j ¤ i , it is
then concluded that the fault i has occurred. The same logic and reasoning can also be
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extended for isolation of simultaneous faults by utilizing the second layer of NSAs. In
this case if rj .t/ D 1 and rk.t/ D 1, and only rj;k.t/ D 0, then the faults j and k are
simultaneously detected and isolated.
4.2 Simulation Results
In this section, the results for implementing the proposed NSA-based FDI scheme corre-
sponding to both non-simultaneous and simultaneous fault scenarios are presented. The
results are then compared with another data-driven approach known as the SVM [123].
Moreover, a non-parametric statistical test, known as the sign test, is implemented in a
pairwise manner (pairwise comparison) for comparing the performance of the proposed
NSA-based methodology with the SVM under various fault cases that range from low
fault severities to high fault severities. 25 Monte Carlo simulation runs are conducted
for each fault scenario corresponding to randomly selected fault severities. However, for
illustration purposes, only results for certain fault severities are provided for each fault
scenario.
Before demonstrating the capabilities of the proposed NSA-based methodology, it
is necessary to provide details on the properties of the NSAs that are used in the FDIs
scheme. The features specifying the shape space are chosen to be outputs of the WT sys-
tem (namely, !g , ˇ, and Pg). This represents a 3-dimensional space. Correspondingly,
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the data points are represented as spheres with self-radius (threshold) of 0.1 that is se-
lected experimentally. Detectors are also chosen to be sphere shaped and are generated
via the V-detector algorithm in which the candidate detector centers are generated ran-
domly. The data samples from the outputs of the WT system along with the generated
detectors in the shape space are shown in Figure 4.4, where the red spheres represent
the normal WT system data that construct the self region and the blue spheres are the
NSA detectors covering whatever is outside the self region (that is the non-self region).
Before implementing the real-valued NSA, as stated earlier it is necessary to nor-
malize the data. For generating the detectors for each NSA, 80% of the data set (the
WT outputs) is used for training and the other 20% is allocated to the testing phase.
In this work, the maximum number of detectors chosen is set sufficiently large to not
terminate the detector generation process too early. Also the termination condition pro-
vided in Figure 3.1(a) is set to 99% coverage of the non-self space for the maximum of
10000 detectors. Therefore, the training phase is completed only when the desired cov-
erage of the non-self region is attained. The justification behind selecting the particular
coverage percentage above is that choosing a higher coverage results in a much higher
processing time as well as a dramatic increase in the number of the detectors that have
to be utilized albeit for a marginally and not too significant higher coverage yield.
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Figure 4.4: The WT outputs and the detectors in the shape space (NSA0). Red spheres: WT
healthy data and blue spheres: detectors generated to cover the non-self region.
4.2.1 Fault Scenario 1: Non-Simultaneous Faults
For illustrating and evaluating the performance of the fault detection scheme (NSA0) as
well as the fault isolation of non-simultaneous faults (through the use of NSA1, NSA2,
and NSA3), three scenarios are considered as described below.
The faults are injected at different time instances as follows:
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 Fault 1 has a loss of effectiveness factor of ıfPg D 0:85 (refer to equation (2.20))
during the time interval 2200s to 2300s.
 Fault 2 has an offset of fˇ D 1:0ı (refer to equation (2.21)) during the time
interval 1200s to 1300s.
 Fault 3 has a damping factor of ! D 15 (refer to equation 2.22)) during the
time interval 3000s to 3100s.
The measured WT outputs corresponding to the healthy situation as well as when the
WT is subjected to presence of all faults (non-simultaneous) are shown in Figure 4.5.
The objective of the first layer of NSAs, as shown in Figure 4.2, is to isolate non-
simultaneous faults and this task is clearly accomplished as shown in Figure 4.6. For
example, the NSA1 considers Fault 1 to be its normal data since NSA1 is trained to be
insensitive to this particular fault while sensitive to all the other faults. By comparing
the fault signatures that are corresponding to NSA0 and NSA1 in Figure 4.6(a), it follows
that Fault 1 is isolated since NSA1 is exposed to faulty samples during the period 2200s-
2300s as healthy, while the NSA0 has already reported that the WT is faulty. Figure
4.6(a) also shows that the NSA3 did not detect any faulty samples (missed detections)
during the period 2255s-2260s. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the isolation of
Fault 2 and Fault 3 based on the results that are shown in Figures 4.6(b) and 4.6(c),
respectively. By comparing the fault residuals corresponding to NSA0 and NSA2 in
Figure 4.6(b), it follows that the Fault 2 is isolated. In case of isolating the Fault 3
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Figure 4.5: The WT measured variables under the healthy and faulty scenarios.
(Figure 4.6(c)), NSA0, NSA1, and NSA2 have missed to detect few faulty data samples,
and NSA3 has few false alarms.
4.2.1.1 Comparison with the Support Vector Machine (SVM)
The proposed NSA-based scheme is now compared with another data-driven method,
namely the Support Vector Machine (SVM) [123], that is based on structural risk mini-
mization, and hence has improved generalization properties. More detail is available in
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(a) The FDI results for the Fault 1 by using the
NSA.
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(b) The FDI results for the Fault 2 by using the
NSA.
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(c) The FDI results for the Fault 3 by using the
NSA.
Figure 4.6: The FDI results for non-simultaneous faults by using the NSA.
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Appendix A. SVMs are widely used in classification problems, however it has also been
applied to FDI of wind turbines in [28] and [30], producing good results.
In order to compare the performance of the proposed NSA-based FDI scheme with
the SVM, first the FDI problem is reformulated as a classification problem [124]. For
performing the FDI task, three SVMs are utilized where they are binary coded. Since
all WT measurements are used in developing the bank of NSAs, the same measurements
(!g , ˇ, and Pg) are also utilized in developing the SVM models. A polynomial kernel
function (4.2) is used in these models. Specifically, the kernel function is defined as
Kd .u; v/ D .r C auTv/d ; a > 0; r > 0 (4.2)
where d denotes the degree and .a; r/ are the parameters of the polynomial kernel
function.
The denoted SVM1, SVM2, and SVM3 are trained to detect the Faults 1, 2, and
3, respectively. A polynomial kernel function of degree 3 is utilized to build the SVM1
and SVM2 models, whereas a polynomial function of degree 5 is used for training the
SVM3. The reason for choosing a higher degree polynomial kernel for SVM3 is due to
the more difficult task of performing the FDI of the Fault 3 when compared with Faults
1 and 2. Consequently, a higher degree polynomial kernel is utilized in order to have a
more flexible decision boundary, and hence, a better FDI of the Fault 3.
For each SVM, 80% of the data set is allocated for training (out of which 20% is
dedicated for cross-validation) and the other 20% is allocated for the testing sets. In
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case of presence of a fault, the SVM produces an output of +1, whereas if the WT
operates normally (that is, healthy), the SVM produces an output of -1. The SVM
outputs corresponding to the three fault cases, indicating the actual WT state as being
either healthy (-1) or faulty (1) are shown in Figure 4.7.
Comparative results between the NSA and SVM methodologies in terms of the
classification accuracy is evaluated under various fault severities where the mean results
are provided in Table 4.3. Specifically, 25 randomly selected fault cases ranging from
low fault severity to high fault severity are considered and tested. In case of Fault 1,
the fault severity ıfPg is randomly varied within 0:25  ıfPg  0:95. In case of Fault
2, the fault bias term fˇ is randomly varied within 0:5
ı  fˇ  10ı, and in case of
Fault 3, ! is randomly varied within 2  !  25.
4.2.1.2 Performance Measure
In order to evaluate the performance of the developed FDI scheme, a confusion matrix
(also known as the binary contingency table) approach is used as illustrated in Table 4.2.
Given a classifier and a data instance, there are four possible outcomes that are [125]:
i) a True Positive (TP) if the instance has been correctly identified,
ii) a True Negative (TN) if the instance has been correctly rejected,
iii) a False Positive (FP) if the instance has been incorrectly identified,
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(a) The FDI results for the Fault 1 by using the
SVM.
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(b) The FDI results for the Fault 2 by using the
SVM.
 Time (seconds)
















(c) The FDI results for the Fault 3 by using the
SVM.
Figure 4.7: The FDI results for non-simultaneous faults by using the SVM (dotted line: the
output of the SVM, red line: the nominal fault vector).
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iv) a False Negative (FN) if the instance has been incorrectly rejected.
In this thesis, three performance measures based on above possible outcomes are
used and they are the Detection Rate (DR), the False Alarm rate (FA), and the F -score
(F). These metrics are formally defined as follows:
Detection Rate (DR) D TP
TPC FN (4.3a)
False Alarm Rate (FA) D FP
TNC FP (4.3b)
F -score .F/ D 2TP
2TPC FNC FP (4.3c)
Table 4.3: Average performance measures for the FDI of the non-simultaneous fault scenarios.
Faults Methodology DR% FA% F -score .F/
Fault 1
SVM1 93.05% 0.398% 0.8846
NSA0 & NSA1 95.69% 0.624% 0.8595
Fault 2
SVM2 97.07% 0.383% 0.9081
NSA0 & NSA2 99.06% 0.396% 0.9162
Fault 3
SVM3 90.46% 0.514% 0.8495
NSA0 & NSA3 88.96% 0.713% 0.8078
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4.2.2 Fault Scenario 2: Simultaneous Faults
In this scenario, simultaneous faults (also known as concurrent faults) are considered
and injected into the WT in order to evaluate the performance of the second layer of
the NSAs. The following three simultaneous fault scenarios are considered:
4.2.2.1 Case 1: Simultaneous Faults 1 and 2
 Fault 1 having a loss of effectiveness of ıfPg D 0:80 during the time interval 1200s
to 1300s.
 Fault 2 having an offset of fˇ D 1:0 degree during the time interval 1250s to
1350s.
The corresponding WT output measured variables are now plotted in Figure 4.8. The
fault detection objective is achieved by utilizing the NSA0, where the corresponding
fault residual r0.t/ is shown in Figure 4.9(a). It follows that the anomaly is detected
during the time period of 1200s – 1350s. By comparing the NSA0 with the NSA1, it
can be concluded that during the time period 1200s – 1250s, only Fault 1 has occurred.
Since the NSA1 is sensitive to all faults, but Fault 1, it considers Fault 2 that starts at
1250s as making the WT faulty.
Similar reasoning can be made for Fault 2 by comparing the NSA0 and NSA2
(as shown in Figure 4.9(a)). The fault residual r1;2.t/ corresponding to the NSA1;2 is
shown in the bottom graph of Figure 4.9(a). The NSA1;2 filter is activated only when
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Figure 4.8: The WT measured variables under the healthy and simultaneous Faults 1 and 2
cases.
r0.t/ D 1, that is between 1200s – 1350s. Since the NSA1;2 is trained to be insensitive
to simultaneous Faults 1 and 2, it will recognize this faulty scenario as healthy during
the time period 1250s – 1300s. Note that the faulty samples during the time periods
1200s – 1250s and 1300s – 1350s in NSA1;2 correspond to any fault scenario rather than
the presence of concurrent Faults 1 and 2.
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Figure 4.10(a) depicts the FDI results for simultaneous Faults 1 and 2 by using
both the SVM1 and SVM2. The time duration when the output of both SVMs predict
the faulty samples corresponds to the case when both Faults 1 and 2 occur simultane-
ously. As shown in Figure 4.10(a), the SVM1 and SVM2 both produce an output of +1
(implying a faulty sample) during 1250s - 1300s. Consequently, one can conclude that
the concurrent Faults 1 and 2 have occurred during that time period.
4.2.2.2 Case 2: Simultaneous Faults 1 and 3
 Fault 1 having a loss of effectiveness of ıfPg D 0:85 during the time interval 3200s
to 3300s.
 Fault 3 having a damping factor of ! D 15 during the time interval 3250s to
3350s.
A similar conclusion for the FDI as in Case 1 can be drawn for simultaneous isolation
of Faults 1 and 3. The corresponding FDI results for the NSA and SVM schemes are
shown in Figures 4.9(b) and 4.10(b), respectively. The NSA1;3 which is responsible for
isolating the concurrent Faults 1 and 3, is activated only when r0.t/ D 1. Therefore,
during 3200s – 3350s by comparing the NSA1;3 with NSA0, it can be concluded that
during the time period 3250s – 3000s, Faults 1 and 3 have occurred simultaneously. It
should be noted that there are few missed detections for NSA0, NSA1, NSA3 as well as
few false alarms for the NSA1;3.
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4.2.2.3 Case 3: Simultaneous Faults 2 and 3
 Fault 2 having an offset of fˇ D 1:0 degree during the time interval 1200s to
1300s.
 Fault 3 having a damping factor of ! D 15 during the time interval 1250s to
1350s.
A similar conclusion for the FDI as in Case 1 can be drawn for the simultaneous isolation
of Faults 2 and 3. The corresponding FDI results for the NSA and SVM schemes are
shown in Figures 4.9(c) and 4.10(c), respectively. In this fault scenario, NSA2;3 (which is
responsible for isolating the concurrent Faults 2 and 3) is activated only when r0.t/ D 1.
Therefore, during 1200s – 1350s by comparing the NSA2;3 with NSA0, it follows that
simultaneous Faults 2 and 3 have occurred during the time period 1250s – 1300s. Note
that in this case there are also few missed detections for NSA0, NSA2, NSA3 as well as
few false alarms for the NSA2;3.
Table 4.4: Average performance measures for the FDI of the simultaneous faults.
Faults Methodology DR% FA% F -score .F/
Faults 1 & 2
SVM1 & SVM2 93.24% 0.382% 0.8883
NSA0 & NSA12 93.70% 0.512% 0.8677
Faults 1 & 3
SVM1 & SVM3 92.61% 0.737% 0.8255
NSA0 & NSA13 89.73% 1.022% 0.7657
Faults 2 & 3
SVM2 & SVM3 94.41% 0.664% 0.8460
NSA0 & NSA23 90.98% 0.830% 0.8011
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(a) The FDI results for simultaneous Faults 1
and 2 by using the NSA.








  Fault 1 ! [3200s-3300s] & Fault 3 ! [3250s-3350s]


























(b) The FDI results for simultaneous Faults 1
and 3 by using the NSA.








  Fault 2 ! [1200s-1300s] & Fault 3 ! [1250s-1350s]


























(c) The FDI results for simultaneous Faults 2
and 3 by using the NSA.
Figure 4.9: The FDI results for simultaneous faults by using the NSA.
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(a) The FDI results for simultaneous Faults 1
and 2 by using the SVM.
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(b) The FDI results for simultaneous Faults 1
and 3 by using the SVM.
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(c) The FDI results for simultaneous Faults 2
and 3 by using the SVM.
Figure 4.10: The FDI results for simultaneous faults by using the SVM (red line: nominal
fault vector, dotted line: the output of the SVM).
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4.2.3 Non-Parametric Statistical Comparison
In order to compare the NSA-based methodology with the SVM, a non-parametric sta-
tistical comparison test is implemented. Non-parametric tests can be implemented for
two types of analysis, namely: pairwise comparisons and multiple comparisons [126]. A
hypothesis testing is employed to draw inferences on the comparison results between the
proposed NSA-based methodology and the SVM. In this chapter, the null hypothesis
(H0) is the statement that there is no difference between the proposed methodology
and the SVM, whereas the alternative hypothesis (H1) shows that there is a significant
difference between the proposed methodology and the SVM. In order to reject a hypoth-
esis, a significance level ˛ is introduced that is the probability below which H0 may be
rejected [126].
In this thesis, a pairwise statistical procedure is chosen due to its feature of per-
forming an individual comparison between two algorithms. The number of times that
an algorithm wins or loses are counted based on the F -score .F/. F -score is used as
a single performance metric to determine which algorithm outperforms (the NSA-based
methodology or the SVM). The reason for choosing the F is due to the fact that in ad-
dition to considering truly identified samples (TP), it also takes both the falsely rejected
(FN) as well as the falsely identified (FP) samples into account.
The number of wins or losses are compared based on the sign test (a form of a two-
tailed binomial test) [126]. Therefore, in the sign test, the number of wins is distributed
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U .NSAF.k/   SVMF.k// ; (4.4)
Loses(-) D NumSim  Wins(+) ; (4.5)
where NumSim denotes the total number of simulation runs, NSAF and SVMF denote
the F -scores of the proposed NSA-based FDI scheme and the SVM, respectively. U./
represents the step function that is defined as follows:
U.x/ D
†
1 x > 0;
0 otherwise:
Since, the proposed NSA-based methodology is tested for 25 different fault sever-
ities for each fault scenario (i.e., NumSim D 25), the critical number of wins that is
needed to achieve the significance levels of ˛ D 0:05 or ˛ D 0:1 are 18 and 17 wins
out of 25, respectively (refer to Table B.1 in Appendix B). More details on the sign
test and other non-parametric statistical procedures in both pairwise as well as multiple
comparisons are available in [126]. The metrics Wins(+) and Loses(-) are evaluated
for each fault scenario considered in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 and the corresponding
non-parametric test results are listed in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Sign test for comparing the performance of NSA against SVM (only the number of
wins/loses of NSA is indicated).




Fault 1 14 11 –
Fault 2 20 5 ˛ D 0:05
Fault 3 6 19 –
Simultaneous
Faults
Faults 1&2 12 13 –
Faults 1&3 6 19 –
Faults 2&3 8 17 –
4.3 Discussion
As mentioned earlier, for comparing the performance of the proposed NSA scheme with
that of the SVM, three quantitative metrics or measures are used, namely: the Detection
Rate, DR%, False Alarm rate, FA%, and the F -score. The average performance results
for both non-simultaneous and simultaneous fault scenarios are shown in Tables 4.3 and
4.4, respectively. The non-parametric statistical comparison results based on the sign
test are provided in Table 4.5.
In case of the SVM scheme, it follows that the false alarm rates are lower than
that of the proposed NSA scheme. This is due to the better generalization performance
(error rates on the test data set) of the SVM. As far as the F -score, the SVM algorithm
shows better performance in all cases except in case of Fault 2. This is due to the fact
that the SVM has lower false alarm rates as compared to the NSA. For example, in case
of Fault 1, the average detection rate of NSA is higher and even it outperforms the SVM
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(14 wins against 11 wins for the SVM). However, the mean F -score is in favor of the
SVM due to the higher false alarm rates of the NSA. Simulation results corresponding
to the proposed NSA-based methodology and the SVM show similar results based on
the pairwise comparison test (Table 4.5). In some cases, the NSA outperforms the SVM.
For instance, in case of Fault 2, the NSA shows a significantly better performance as
compared to the SVM with a level of significance ˛ D 0:05. However, in case of non-
simultaneous Fault 3, the SVM has a better performance as compared to the NSA in
isolating the Fault 3.
The most significant limitation of the SVM is in the choice of a proper kernel
function. This issue has also been raised in previous works such as [127]. For the SVM
scheme, the input data is transformed into a higher dimensional space where they can
be separated linearly. The kernel function has a significant role in this mapping process
and the selection of the best choice for a given problem is still an open area of research.
In this work, a polynomial kernel function is used (equation (4.2)). The use of the
polynomial kernel requires tuning several parameters simultaneously. The problem of
fine tuning the kernel parameters exists in other kernel functions such as the Gaussian
Radial Basis Function (RBF). On the other hand, the main parameter in implementing
the V-detector that needs to be tuned is the threshold of data instances (the self-radius of
the spheres), which is not a challenging task. Note that the two parameters, namely the
maximum number of detectors and the coverage of non-self region are often initialized
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at the start of the process and do not require to be fine tuned thereafter. In this work,
polynomial kernels of degrees 3 and 5 are used for developing the SVM models, whereas
all the NSAs have the same properties as mentioned in Section 4.2.
Another advantage of the V-detector is its less computational complexity during
the training phase as compared with the SVM. The complexity of the V-detector algo-
rithm is O.mjStr j/, where m denotes the preset number of detectors and jStr j denotes
the size of the training set [116]. On the other hand, the computational complexity
for solving the nonlinear SVM regardless of the particular solver algorithm lies between
O.jStr j2/ and O.jStr j3/ [128], [129]. In this work, the preset number of detectors was
chosen to be 10000 (hence, m D 10000), and the size of the training set, jStr j, is selected
as 35,200 samples.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, an FDI scheme based on the NSA is developed. The proposed NSA-
based FDI scheme is applied to the WT benchmark in order to detect and isolate certain
fault scenarios (both simultaneous as well as non-simultaneous faults). The proposed
scheme includes a bank of NSAs that are configured into a hierarchical structure for
the fault isolation task. Moreover, a moving window filter is utilized to improve the
FDI performance. Finally, a non-parametric statistical comparison test is implemented
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to compare the performance of the proposed NSA-based FDI methodology with a well-




In this chapter, a sensor FDI framework is developed based on Dendritic Cell Algorithm
(DCA) to detect and isolate sensor faults within a system. The proposed DCA-based
FDI scheme is then compared with the previously developed NSA-based FDI scheme,
and a non-parametric statistical comparison test is conducted.
5.1 Proposed DCA-based FDI Scheme
In the proposed DCA-based FDI methodology, it is assumed that sensors are physically
redundant in order to be able to detect and isolate the corresponding sensor faults. The
justification behind this assumption is that modern industrial WTs employ conservative
hardware redundant FDI and health monitoring systems [33,130,131]. For instance, the
work [132] developed an observer-based fuzzy FTC method for the FTC of Wind Energy
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Conversion Systems (WECSs), in which a multi-sensor scheme using hardware redundant
sensors is employed. Likewise, the work [133] exploits the physically redundant sensor
measurements to generate the necessary fault residuals for the fault detection of the WT
benchmark model.
The main steps for implementation of the proposed DCA-based FDI scheme is


















Figure 5.1: The proposed DCA-based sensor FDI scheme.
5.1.1 Noise Filter Design
A design of the noise filter is recommended in order to remove measurement noise. A
noise filter processes highly noisy data providing a more suitable data for FDI purposes.
A first-order low-pass filter is employed for this purpose. The transfer function of the




T s C 1 (5.1)
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where OSmj .s/ D LfOsmj .t/g and Smj .s/ D Lfsmj .t/g denote the Laplace transforms of the
filtered and the raw data, respectively, and T denotes the time constant of the transfer
function. A discrete-time realization of equation (5.1) by using backward Euler method
is provided below
Osmj Œk D ˛ smj ŒkC .1   ˛/ Osmj Œk   1; (5.2)
where Osmj Œk and smj Œk denote the filtered and the raw data at time k, respectively,
and ˛ 2 .0; 1 denotes the filter smoothing factor that can be calculated as follows:
˛ D t
T Ct
where t denotes the time step.
The time constant of the filter, T , is chosen such that the following condition,





where fs D 1=t denotes the sampling frequency and B D 1=.2T / denotes the band-
width of the filter (in Hz).
5.1.2 Signal Categorization
The objective of the Signal Categorization block is to prepare the input signals for each
sensor (PS, DS, SS) that are applied to the DCA as follows:
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 PAMP Signal (PS): PS signal is chosen to be the difference between two sensor
readings that measure the same output as shown below. The reason behind this
selection is due to the big difference between the two sensor readings that measure
the same quantity indicates a strong possibility of an abnormality in the system.
The PS signal can be expressed as:
PSSmj .t/ D . 1/jC1
 OSm1.t/   OSm2.t/ ;
 Danger Signal (DS): DS signal is chosen to be the difference between two con-
secutive time samples of a measurement. The DS signal can be expressed as:
DSSmj .t/ D OSmj .t/   OSmj .t   1/:
 Safe Signal (SS): Similar to the DS, the SS signal is chosen to be the difference
between the current time and the previous time samples, namely
SSSmj .t/ D OSmj .t/   OSmj .t   1/:
In addition to above three input signals, a non-time varying signal (IC) is used to amplify
the effects of the other three signals. Moreover, in this work a binary variable DC is




For each sensor, a DCA filter is assigned that generates a binary residual vectors (fault
indicator) showing the behavior of the corresponding sensor. If the j -th sensor is faulty
at time t , then rSDCA;mj .t/ D 1. Similarly, rSDCA;mj .t/ D 0 corresponds to a normal
behavior of the sensor at time t . For instance, in case of the sensor ˇi;mj , the fault






1 the j -th sensor measuring ˇi is faulty at time t
0 the j -th sensor measuring ˇi is healthy at time t
(5.4)
In order to generate the DCA residual signals (rSDCA;mj ), the output of each DC, which
determines the maturity level of the DC, is evaluated based on the concentration of the
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where WPS, WDS, and WSS denote the signal weights that are predefined by users and can
be either positive or negative, depending on the values of PS, DS, and SS in the immune
system. In the original DCA developed by Greensmith [65], the signal weights are chosen
based on empirical biological data. If DCSout;mj .t/ is less than the Migration Threshold
(DCSout;mj .t/ < Migration Threshold ), the corresponding DC matures to a smDC (refer
to Section 3.2.1), and hence DC = 0. However, if DCSout;mj .t/ > Migration Threshold ,
then the DC matures to a mDC and consequently DC = 1. A new variable DCstore
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is defined that stocks previous status of DC for the last TimeWindow time samples.
The variable TimeWindow is crucial for constructing an online FDI decision criterion
or logic. The procedure of temporarily storing the status of DC is known as the Time-
Based Segmentation (TBS), in which a fixed segment size (TimeWindow) is adapted
within the DCA filter as suggested in [120]. Then, if the number of mDC ( Num mDC )
is greater than a given Threshold, all content of that TimeWindow will be set to 1.
Pseudocode 2 illustrates the step by step implementation of the proposed DCA filter.
In order to have a fault indicating signal for a sensor at each time sample t , the variable
rSDCA;mj .t/, which is a global count, is introduced that returns a binary value at time t .
5.2 Simulation Results
In this section, the sensor faults considered in the WT benchmark model [13] are pre-
sented and the corresponding details are provided. Then, the simulation results of the
proposed DCA-based FDI scheme and comparison with the proposed NSA-based FDI
scheme in Chapter 4 are provided.
5.2.1 Fault Scenarios
Overall, there are five sensor faults that are considered in the WT benchmark model [13]
as modeled and described in Section 2.4.1.1. Table 5.1 lists all injected fault scenarios
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Pseudocode 2: Pseudocode of the proposed DCA filter.
Input: Antigen D Œ OSm1.t/; OSm2.t/ // Filtered Sensor Measurements
Output: rSDCA;mj .t/ .j 2 f1; 2g/ // Residual Signals
Initialization
Number of Antigen = Number of Sensors;
Migration Threshold ; // DC lifespan
IC; // inflammatory signal
T imeW indow;
T hreshold ; // Fault threshold
foreach DC do
Calculate PSSmj .t/, DS
S
mj
.t/, SSSmj .t/ ;
Calculate DC Sout;mj from equation (5.5);
if DC Sout;mj < Migration Threshold then
DC D 0; // iDC ! smDC
else
DC D 1; // iDC ! mDC
end
DCstore.t   T imeW indow/ D DC ;
Num mDC D 0; // # of mDC in DCstore
for all members of DCstore do




if Num mDC > Threshold then Set all members
DCstore D 1;
end
for each Antigen type do




Table 5.1: All sensor faults considered in the benchmark model [13].
Fault # Faulty Sensor Fault Type Fault Severity Injected Time
S1 Blade 1 pitch position (ˇ1;m1) Fixed value ˇ1;m1 D 5ı 2000s to 2100s
S2 Blade 2 pitch position (ˇ2;m2) Gain factor ˇ2;m2 D 1:2 3200s to 3300s
S3 Blade 3 pitch position (ˇ3;m1) Fixed value ˇ3;m1 D 10ı 2600s to 2700s
S4 Rotor speed sensor (!r;m1) Fixed value !r;m1 D 1:4 rad/s 1500s to 1600s
S5
Generator and rotor speed
Gain factor
!r;m2 D 1:1 1000s to 1100s
sensors (!r;m2 & !g;m2) !g;m2 D 0:9
that are considered in the WT model. More detail about each fault type is available in
Subsection 2.4.1.1.
5.2.2 Simulation Results of Proposed DCA-based FDI
A distributed version of the proposed DCA-based FDI scheme for sensor faults (Figure
5.1) is applied to the WT system and is illustrated in Figure 5.2, where the sensor FDI of
each WT subsystem is performed apart from the other subsystems. The corresponding
DCA fault residuals for each sensor are shown in Figures 5.4 – 5.9.
5.2.2.1 Noise Filter Parameters
A low-pass filter is employed to reduce the noisy pitch position as well as the rotational
speed measurements (refer to Section 5.1.1 for the design procedure). The time con-
stants of the filters (T in equation (5.1)) are selected as follows: Tˇ D 0:06s for the noise





























































(p = g , r where
g : generator & r : rotor)
Figure 5.2: The proposed DCA-based sensor FDI scheme for the benchmark WT model.
for the rotor and generator speed measurements. It should be noted that the time con-
stants meet the Nyquist criterion (equation (5.3)). However, they are tuned empirically
based on the filtering performance. Figure 5.3 illustrates the raw and the filtered sen-
sor measurements using the above selected time constants. Note that the gain factor
fault in rotor speed measurements, !r;mj , cannot be observed if the noise filter is not
implemented.
5.2.2.2 DCA Filter Parameters
The parameters of the DCA filter are user-specified and are selected based on empirical
results obtained from implementations. Given the dual sensor redundancy, the number of
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(a) Low-pass filter applied to the ˇm.t/ with
Tˇ D 0:06s.
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(b) Low-pass filter applied to the !g.t/ with
T!g D 0:02s.
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(c) Low-pass filter applied to the !r .t/ with
T!r D 0:75s.
Figure 5.3: Raw and filtered sensor measurements for ˇi;mj .t/, !g.t/, and !r.t/.
Antigens is chosen to be two. The constant signal IC in equation (5.5) that amplifies the
other input signals is trivial in most cases (i.e., IC D 1) except in case of the FDI of !r;mj
sensor that is selected as IC D 27. The reason behind this selection is due to the difficulty
in FDI of the gain factor fault in rotor speed measurements, !r;mj , and the need for
amplification of the other input signals .PS!rmj ; DS
!r
mj
; and SS!rmj /. The signals weights
in equation (5.5) are chosen based on the number of sensors (in our case two sensors
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for each subsystem) as follows: WPS D  2, WDS D 2, and WSS D  2. Moreover, the
other DCA filter parameters are empirically chosen as follows: Migration Threshold D
1 ; T imeW indow D 10 ; and T hreshold D 8.
The DCA filters are capable of detecting and isolating all the injected sensor faults
with few false alarms. Figures 5.4 – 5.9 show the residuals generated by implementing the




D 1 during 2000 – 2100s meaning that the blade 1 pitch position sensor ˇ1;m1
is faulty during that time period. Similarly, faults in sensors !r;m1 (1500 – 1600s) and







D 1 in Figures 5.7(a) and 5.9(b), respectively. There are few false alarms in case
of sensors ˇ2;m1 and ˇ3;m2 in which DCA
ˇ2 and DCAˇ3 incorrectly output rˇ2DCA;m1 D 1
and rˇ3DCA;m2 D 1 as indicated in Figures 5.5(a) and 5.6(b), respectively. In case of Fault
S2 in the sensor ˇ2;m2 that is of the type gain factor (refer to Table 5.1), not all the
samples during 3200 - 3300s are considered to be faulty as illustrated in Figure 5.5(b).
This is due to the fact that whenever the pitch position is at zero angle (ˇ2;m2 D 0ı),
the faulty sensor shows ˇ2;m2 D 1:2  0ı D 0ı, and hence no fault can be detected.
Similarly, in case of Fault S5 in the sensor !r;m2 , the DCA
!r
m2
has missed detecting and
isolating few faulty samples during 1000 - 1100s as shown in Figure 5.8(b).
106
7LPHVHFRQGV





(a) rˇ1DCA;m1 residual signal.
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(b) rˇ1DCA;m2 residual signal.
Figure 5.4: The residual signal due to the Fault S1. The DCAˇ1 residual signals for the pitch
sensors of the blade 1.
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(a) rˇ2DCA;m1 residual signal.
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(b) rˇ2DCA;m2 residual signal.
Figure 5.5: The residual signal due to the Fault S2. The DCAˇ2 residual signals for the pitch
sensors of the blade 2.
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(a) rˇ3DCA;m1 residual signal.
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(b) rˇ3DCA;m2 residual signal.
Figure 5.6: The residual signal due to the Fault S3. The DCAˇ3 residual signals for the pitch
sensors of the blade 3.
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(a) r!rDCA;m1 residual signal.
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(b) r!rDCA;m2 residual signal.









(a) r!rDCA;m1 residual signal.
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(b) r!rDCA;m2 residual signal.
Figure 5.8: The residual signal due to the Faults S5. The DCA!r residual signals for the rotor
speed sensors.
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Figure 5.9: The residual signal due to the Fault S5. The DCA!g residual signals for the
generator speed sensors.
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5.2.3 Comparison with the Proposed NSA-based FDI
In this section, simulation results from previous section are compared with the proposed
NSA-based methodology developed in Chapter 4.
Figure 5.10 shows the bank of NSAs used that is used for the task of FDI. As noted
in Figure 5.10, the features determining the shape space are chosen to be the filtered
sensor measurements of each subsystem, as in Figure 5.2. By choosing similar inputs to
the proposed DCA-based methodology, a fair comparison can be made in evaluating the


















































(p = g , r where
g : generator & r : rotor)
Figure 5.10: The NSA-based sensor FDI scheme for the benchmark WT model.
A similar procedure explained in Chapter 4 is applied here to perform the sensor
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FDI in the WT system. For performing the fault detection task, the first NSA, namely
NSAˇi is trained to detect any change in the behavior of the pitch actuator i and to
remain insensitive to only the healthy data samples generated by the pitch actuator
system. The residual signal generated by NSAˇi is designated by rˇiNSA. However, for
isolating the fault, two NSAs are constructed where each NSA is trained to be insensitive
to a particular actuator. For instance, NSAˇimj is trained to be insensitive to the blade i
pitch sensor j . A similar fault detection as well as fault isolation procedure are applied
to the rotational speed sensors. It should be noted that 80% of the data is allocated for
the training stage while the remaining 20% is allocated for the test stage.
In order to compare DCA and NSA frameworks (Figures 5.2 and 5.10, respectively),
25 Monte Carlo simulation runs are conducted for each fault type corresponding to
randomly selected fault severities. Table 5.2 lists the average performance for the FDI
of the sensor faults. Moreover, a nonparametric statistical comparison test is conducted
based on the results of the Monte Carlo simulation runs, in which the null hypothesis
(H0) is the statement that there is no difference between the DCA-based FDI scheme
and the NSA-based FDI scheme, whereas the alternative hypothesis (H1) shows that
there is a significant difference between both schemes.
The result of the nonparametric statistical test is listed in Table 5.3, in which the
number of wins refer to the number of simulation cases (out of 25) that the DCA-based
FDI scheme outperforms the NSA-based FDI one. Similar to equation (4.4), the metric
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U  DCASF.k/   NSASF.k/ ; (5.6)
where DCASF and NSA
S
F denote the F -scores of the DCA-based and the NSA-based
FDI schemes for the sensor S.t/, respectively. Like in previous chapter, NumSim D 25
and Loses(-) can be evaluated according to equation (4.5).
Table 5.2: Average performance measures for the FDI of the sensor faults.
Faults Methodology DR% FA% F -score .F/
Fault S1
DCAˇ1 98.06% 0.061% 0.9769
NSAˇ1 & NSAˇ1m1 97.49% 0.220% 0.9417
Fault S2
DCAˇ2      
NSAˇ2 & NSAˇ2m2      
Fault S3
DCAˇ3 97.42% 0.139% 0.9575
NSAˇ3 & NSAˇ3m1 97.96% 0.157% 0.9565
Fault S4
DCA!r 97.88% 0.135% 0.9607
NSA!r & NSA!rm1 98.15% 0.204% 0.9481
Fault S5
DCA!g 98.57% 0.073% 0.9771
NSA!g & NSA!gm2 98.42% 0.119% 0.9705
DCA!r 79.19% 0.355% 0.8115
NSA!r & NSA!rm2      
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(a) NSA residual signals generated for the pitch
sensors of balde 1.
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(b) NSA residual signals generated for the pitch
sensors of balde 2.
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(c) NSA residual signals generated for the pitch
sensors of balde 3.
Figure 5.11: The NSA residual signals for the WT pitch sensors.
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(a) NSA residual signals generated for the rotor
speed sensors.
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(b) NSA residual signals generated for the genera-
tor speed sensors.
Figure 5.12: The NSA residual signals for rotor and generator speed sensors.
5.3 Discussion
As shown in Table 5.2, the DCA has a higher F -score in all cases. This is due to
the higher false alarm rates of the NSA-based FDI scheme as compared to the DCA-
based FDI scheme. Even in the case that NSA-based FDI scheme has shown to have,
on average, better detection rates (namely in Faults S3 and S4), the DCA-based FDI
scheme has a higher F -score.
In case of Fault S2, the performance cannot be fairly measured due to the fact
that the pitch position can be at zero angle, ˇi.t/ D 0, (see Section 2.3), and hence
fˇi;mj D 0 no matter what the value of ˇi;mj is (refer to equation (2.25)). In case
of Fault S5 that affects both the rotor as well as generator speed sensors simultaneously,
114
NSA-based FDI scheme could not detect and isolate the sensor fault in !r;m2 during
1000s   1100s.
Table 5.3 illustrates results of the nonparametric comparison analysis between
the DCA-based and NSA-based FDI schemes. The number of Wins(+) and Loses(-)
of the DCA-based FDI scheme is considered here (refer to equations (5.6) and (4.5),
respectively). As can be seen, the DCA-based FDI scheme outperforms the NSA-based
FDI scheme with the significance level of ˛ D 0:1 in FDI of all sensor faults except Fault
S3. The main reason for better results in case of the DCA-based FDI scheme is due to
high false alarm rates of the NSA. The issue of high false alarm has also been raised in
Chapter 4. Since no performance measure is obtained in case of Fault S2, hence the sign
test cannot be conducted for this fault.
Table 5.3: Sign test for comparing the performance of DCA against NSA (only the number of
wins/loses of DCA is indicated).
Wins (C) Loses ( ) Difference
Fault S1 22 3 ˛ D 0:1
Fault S2      
Fault S3 10 15  
Fault S4 19 6 ˛ D 0:1
Fault S5
20 5 ˛ D 0:1
25 0 ˛ D 0:1
According to [120], the runtime complexity of the standard DCA is bounded by
O.n2/, where n denotes the data size, and the runtime complexity of the DCA with
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segmentation is bounded by O.max.nN; nz//, where N denotes the DC population size,
and z denotes the segment size (T imeW indow). On the other hand, the complexity
of V-detector is O.mn/ (Section 4.3), where m denotes the preset number of detectors.
Hence, both the V-detector as well as the DCA version (integrated with Time-Based
Segmentation (TBS)) used in this thesis have linear runtime complexities. However,
DCA is slightly faster than V-detector and that is due to the fact that in this work, the
DC population size is N D 2 and the segment size z D 10, whereas the preset number
of detectors in the V-detector algorithm is chosen to be 1000, and hence m D 1000.
Moreover, the developed DCA-based FDI scheme does not require a training phase while
the NSA-based FDI scheme requires a detector generation (training) phase.
A common FDI approach in the literature in case of dual sensor redundancy is to
first detect the fault by a direct comparison of the dual sensors, and then to perform the
isolation task using one of analytical redundancy approaches. However, the proposed
DCA-based FDI scheme performs both fault detection as well as fault isolation tasks,
simultaneously.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, an FDI scheme based on the DCA is developed. The proposed DCA-
based FDI scheme is applied to the WT benchmark in order to detect and isolate all
sensor faults considered in the benchmark model. A time-segmentation is integrated
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within the DCA filter in order to perform the FDI task in an online manner and also to
reduce the runtime complexity. Finally, a non-parametric statistical comparison test is
implemented to compare the performance of the proposed DCA-based FDI scheme with
the previously developed NSA-based FDI scheme in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, the problem of Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) of the wind turbine
system is addressed by using two different immune inspired algorithm, namely the Neg-
ative Selection Algorithm (NSA) and the Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA).
First, a bank of NSAs is proposed and implemented for detecting and isolating
faults in the WT. The fault detection objective is achieved by training an NSA with
only normal or healthy data. However, both healthy and faulty data are used for ac-
complishing the fault isolation task and various NSAs are configured into a hierarchical
structure that are trained to isolate different fault scenarios, including concurrent fault
cases. To improve the FDI performance, as well as to remove the outliers, a mov-
ing window NSAs is applied to the residual signals that are generated by the NSAs.
Multiple fault scenarios are presented to highlight the performance capabilities of the
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proposed FDI scheme. The results are also compared with the Support Vector Machine
(SVM) scheme, where the detection and isolation performance versus the computational
complexity and simplicity in training are all taken into account and evaluated. A non-
parametric statistical comparison test is also implemented to compare the proposed
NSA-based FDI methodology with the SVM corresponding to various fault severities.
The SVM and NSA simulation results show a similar performance, and under certain
fault scenarios, the NSA outperforms the SVM.
The second scheme that is developed in this thesis is an DCA-based online sensor
FDI methodology. The time segmentation (time window) is integrated within the DCA
filters to develop an online FDI methodology as well as to reduce the runtime complex-
ity. The main utility and advantage of the proposed DCA-based methodology is that no
training data is needed, which is an important feature of DCA. The proposed framework
is tested on the WT benchmark model in which the proposed scheme is successful in
detecting and isolating all sensor fault scenarios that are introduced in the benchmark.
Moreover, the proposed DCA-based FDI methodology is compared with the NSA-based
FDI scheme. Monte Carlo simulation runs as well as non-parametric statistical compar-
ison test are conducted to illustrate the effectiveness and capabilities of the DCA-based
proposed scheme.
The NSAs as well as DCA, and in general immune system inspired schemes are
still a young research field. More studies should be conducted to further develop these
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techniques in the field of FDI of complex industrial systems.
6.1 Future Work
Some suggestions for future work on both NSA and the DCA are provided below:
6.1.1 Future Work on the NSA
 Optimizing the detector generation mechanism of the NSA with the objective of
covering as much of the non-self space as possible with a minimum number of
detectors (and hence reducing detectors’ overlap).
 Investigating the issue of high false alarm rates (due to the high False Positive
(FP)) of the NSA, and consequently improving its performance.
 Conducting studies on the relationship between data instances, and consequently
developing a population-based version of the NSA (rather than an instance-based
algorithm).
 Conducting more research on the use of new metrics and distances to be used in
the detector generation as well as the monitoring phase of the NSA algorithm,
especially in the case of high-dimensional data.
 Addressing the issue of the input scaling as a necessary preprocessing step of the
NSA, particularly in case of real-valued NSA.
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 Conducting studies on the use of different detector shapes (in addition to the
hypersphere) in case of real-valued NSA, or even to use various detector shapes.
 Integrating an online learning mechanism in to the NSA for updating detectors in
the detector set.
 Automatic tuning of NSA parameters such as the self-radius of data instances in
case of real-valued NSA.
6.1.2 Future Work on the DCA
 Automating the data pre-processing phase and exploring the use of feature selec-
tion techniques to choose suitable input signals for the DCA.
 Developing a framework for the FDI of actuator faults as well as system faults in
theWT benchmark model. A pre-processing mechanism to choose input signals of
the DCA may be necessary for this task.
 Developing a systematic way of choosing weights for signal transformation with
the goal of maximizing the detection accuracy.
 Integrating a dynamic segmentation into the DCA.
 Automatic tuning of DCA parameter, particularly in case of the original DCA that
includes many stochastic parameters.
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Support Vector Machine (SVM)
The Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a relatively new supervised learning technique
that is based on statistical learning theory that is introduced in 90’s [123]. The SVMs are
applied in classification and regression areas and have been widely used in data mining
applications.
In the SVM, the basic idea is to map the data from the input space into a higher
dimensional feature space, and then find an optimal hyperplane that maximizes the
margin between the classes. SVMs are an example of two-class linear classifier, and the
goal is to find a hyperplane that divides the two classes with the largest margin (Figure
A.1). The decision function of the classifier is given by
fw;b D sgnŒwTxC b (A.1)
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Figure A.1: Maximum margin hyperplane (reprinted from [135]).
In a training set where the data is linearly separable, and a hard margin (no
slack allowed) is used, the support vectors are the points which lie along the supporting
hyperplanes (the hyperplanes parallel to the dividing hyperplane at the edges of the
margin). All of the support vectors lie exactly on the margin. Regardless of the number
of dimensions or size of data set, the number of support vectors could be as little as 2.
In general, the the classification problem would be to find a hyperplane in a high
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dimensional feature space Z, which divides the training instances (in the feature space)
in a way that all the points within the same category on the same side of the hyperplane
(Figure A.2). In this case, a map z D ˆ.x/ is constructed from the input space IRn
to a higher dimensional space Z and find the optimal hyperplane in Z such that the
separation margin between positive and negative instances is maximized. As a result,
the decision function of the classifier would be as follows
fw;b D sgnŒwTzC b; (A.2)
Figure A.2: Mapping data into higher dimensions (Image by MIT OpenCourseWare).
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A.1 Formulation of SVMs
Given a training set of instance-label pairs .xi ; yi/, i D 1; : : : ; N where xi 2 IRn (n is
the dimension of the input space), and y 2 f 1; 1gN , the SVM require the solution of









Tˆ.xi/C b/  1   i ; i D 1; :::; N
i  0; i D 1; : : : ; N
(A.3)
where C > 0 is a regularization parameter for the trade-off between model complexity
and training error, and the slack variable i measures the difference between w
Tz C b
and yi . Due to the presence of the slack variable i , the above formulation is referred to
as soft margin SVM.
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers for nonlinear constrained optimizations,































0  ˛i  c; i D 1; : : : ; N:
(A.5)
The dual formulation of the SVM optimization problem depends on the data only
through dot products. The dot product can therefore be replaced with a nonlinear kernel
function, thereby performing large-margin separation in the feature space of the kernel.
In other words, the kernel trick simplifies the quadratic optimizations used in support
vector machines by replacing a dot product of feature vectors in the feature space with
a kernel evaluation over the input space.
By introducing a kernel function K.x; y/ satisfying K.xi ; xj / D ˆ.xi/Tˆ.xj /, the
















  c1i  ai  c2i ; i D 1; : : : ; N
(A.6)
where ai D ˛iyi ; c1i D  c.sgn.1   yi// ; c2i D c.sgn.1C yi//.
Note that the decision function given in (A.2) can be replaced by the following
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function




ai K.xi ; x/C b
#
: (A.7)
Some of popular kernels are given below
 Polynomial kernel K.x; y/ D .xTyC 1/p,
 Gaussian kernel K.x; y/ D e  kx yk
2
22 ,
 Multilayer Perceptron kernel K.x; y/ D tanh.x  yC /.
Consider a training set of pairs .xi ; yi/; i D 1; :::; l where xi 2 IRn and the class
labels yi 2 f 1; 1gl . The SVM requires the solution to the following quadratic program-










T.xi/C b/  1   i ;
i  0:
(A.8)
where  is the function that maps the training vectors xi into a higher dimensional space.
The regularization parameter C > 0 is a penalty factor applied to the error term. The
direct solution to the optimization problem (A.8) is challenging due to the number of
variables that are involved and the evaluation of the mapping function .x/. Therefore,



















0  ˛i  c; i D 1; : : : ; N;
(A.9)
where a kernel function K.x; y/ satisfying K.xi ; xj /  .xi/T.xj / is introduced. The
kernel function that is used here is the Radial Basis Function (RBF), and has the fol-
lowing description
K.xi ; xj / D e kxi xj k2;  > 0; (A.10)
Note that this is the same as the Gaussian kernel, except the term  is used instead of
1
22




Table B.1: Critical values for the two-tailed sign test for ˛ D 0:05 and ˛ D 0:1 levels of
significance [126].
# Cases 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
˛ D 0:05 5 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 10 11 12 12 13 13 14 15 15 16 17 18 18
˛ D 0:1 5 6 6 7 7 8 9 9 10 10 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 16 16 17
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Figure B.1: A snapshot of the WT Simulink model.
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